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Preface: 
 
In 689 A.D., Mochuo Khan 默啜可汗, the great khan of the recently rejuvenate Eastern 
Turkish confederacy (descendent of the Northern Turkish confederacy), sent a marriage 
request to the female Chinese empire, Wu Zetian 武則天 in the hope that a male member 
of the Chinese imperial family would marry the great khan’s daughter, a princess from the 
Turkish royal clan. After a brief discussion with her courtiers, Wu Zetian appointed her 
nephew’s son, Wu Yanxiu 武延秀, to be the great khan’s son-in-law. Accompanied by other 
courtiers, who had been hastily appointed as assistances and diplomats, the young man 
marched to Mochuo’s court with lavish gifts and the best wishes of the emperor; because of 
its military weakness, the empire needed to cultivate friendly relations with the confederacy 
now more than ever. When Wu Yanxiu arrived Mochuo Khan’s court, however, the great khan 
was disappointed to see that the Chinese son-in-law was a member of the Wu family, not of 
the Li family. The great khan expressed his anger in a statement about this marriage: For 
generations, he said, the Turkish people had surrendered to the house of Tang 唐 (founded 
by the Li Yuan 李淵 in 618 A.D.) and obeyed its orders. How could a member of the Wu family, 
with a humble and unheard of surname, be sent to marry my daughter? I heard that the 
bloodline of Li didn’t break yet, two male members still alive and I was going to restore their 
positions. Afterwards, the great khan put Wu Yanxiu into prison and forced one of the Chinese 
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courtiers who had accompaines the mission to guide the Turkish cavalry in a devastating 
assault on Chinese troops. 
 
This story was recorded multiple times in Chinese sources1. The narration itself is replete with 
biases record-keepers and historians because Wu Zetian’s “emperorship” was not universally 
accepted even by her contemporaries on account of her gender and the way she had “stole” 
the imperial power from her husband, Li Zhi 李治, the third emperor of Tang. However, the 
story does point to a number of historical truth. First, Mozhuo did reject Wu Yanxiu as his son-
in-law. Second, Tang had successfully incorporated many Northern Turkish chiefs and tribes 
into the empire, with which Wu Zetian’s newly founded Zhou 周 could not compare. And, 
third, according to According to Mozhuo’s, obedience from the Turkish people gave Tang the 
authority to marry the great khan’s daughter. Since such political marriages between powerful 
households had been widely practiced and also adopted by Tang and its northern neighbors, 
the Chinese sources are very likely to be true, or at least close to Mozhuo’s original idea.  
 
Inspired by this story, this thesis will start from the following question: how did Tang 
incorporate the remnants of the Northern Turkish confederacy into the empire? To answer 
                                                     
1 Liu Xu 劉昫, Jiu Tang Shu《舊唐書》(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1975), vol.6, p.127; vol.194, p.5169; vol.77, 
p.2679; vol.183, p.4733. Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修, Xin Tang Shu《新唐書》(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1975), vol.100, 
p.3942; vol.205, p.5839; vol.215, p.6045. Du You 杜佑, Tong Dian《通典》(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1988), 
vol.198, p.5435. Sima Guang 司馬光, Zi Zhi Tong Jian《資治通鑑》(Changsha: Yuelu Shushe, 2010), vol.206, 
p.442. 
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this question, I will focus on the reigns of the first Tang emperor, Li Yuan (r. 618 - 626 A.D.), 
and of his successor, Li Shimin 李世民 (r. 626 – 649 A.D.). The former sustained numerous 
threats from the confederacy during the early years of the dynasty, while it was the latter who 
eventually incorporated the Turkish remnants into the empire after the fall of the Northern 
Turkish confederacy. On the confederate side, I will focus on Shibi Khan 始畢可汗 (r. 609 – 
619 A.D.), Chuluo Khan 處羅可汗 (r. 619 – 620 A.D.), and Xieli Khan 頡利可汗 (r. 620 – 630 
A.D.) with emphasis on the latter two. 
 
This exploration will be divided into three chapters. Chapter One will focus on the political 
turmoil in north China after the collapse of Sui dynasty. As only one among many rebel powers 
in north China, Tang had to come to terms with the fact that the only political core within what 
we will call the greater East Asian hinterland was the Northern Turkish confederacy. If Tang 
wanted to transform itself into another political core, it needed to deal with both the military 
threats from the confederacy and the devastating consequence of the collapse of Sui which 
itself had been caused both directly and indirectly by the confederacy. As we will see, Tang 
wasn’t able to fully achieve either security or its political goals before the downfall of the 
confederacy. 
 
In Chapter Two, we shall turn our attention to the confederacy and to identifying the internal 
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weaknesses that were presented despite the confederacy’s hegemony over the East Asian 
hinterland. The first weakness was the nature of the confederacy’s political structure. The 
Chinese sources indicate that Xieli Khan put his trust in Han-Chinese advisor(s) as well as 
Sogdian-Iranians at the expense of his own Turkish tribal men in an attempt to increase the 
personal power of the great khan. This move, however, upset the political traditions of Inner 
Asian confederations, adversely affected the interests of the other tribes, and provoked 
widespread dissatisfaction. Of course, this single issue – Xieli Khan’s attempt at centralization 
– could not bring down the confederacy by itself. Under Xieli Khan, the confederacy was still 
the strongest military existence in East Asia and a mortal threat to the fledgling Tang. A more 
decisive blow was, in fact, the spate of cold weather which undermined the economic basis 
of the confederacy and Xieli Khan’s power. Finally, the military strength of the confederacy 
was weakened by the disunity between Xieli Khan and other Ashina elites from the Turkish 
royal clan, such as Tuli Khan 突利可汗. The downfall of the confederacy may be attributed to 
these three internal weaknesses; Tang was still the weaker party and had little to do with 
confederacy’s collapse, but it did exploit these weaknesses in its quest to become the 
dominant power.  
 
Chapter Three will investigate the incorporation within the Tang empire of the confederate 
defectors. To this end, I will distinguish among the defectors between commoners and elites 
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and discuss them separately. With respect to the commoners, Tang decided to settle them in 
Ordos region and allow them to maintain their political customs in exchange for military 
service to the empire. With respect to the elites, they were incorporated as the military 
officers of the Tang army. As we shall find discover, the relationship between Li Shimin and his 
military officers, Chinese or not, was a personal relationship between a superior and a 
subordinate, unlike the bureaucratic relationship between the emperor and his officials.  
 
Although this thesis will not discuss Li Shimin’s Korean campaign, I would argue that it too 
must be placed in the context of Tang-Turkish relations and the incorporation of Turks into the 
Chinese empire. Traditionally, historians consider Li Shimin’s Korean campaign a waste of 
resources and a meaningless display of Tang’s military power. Even Li Shimin himself 
acknowledged that he nearly traversed the same failed path as that emperor Yang Guang 楊
廣 (Sui Yangdi 隋煬帝). However, research has demonstrated that even Yang Guang’s Korean 
campaigns had multiple strategic purposes2. Li Shimin’s Korean campaign also deserves a re-
examination. For Tang, the major goal of Korean campaign was to occupy, or at least subjugate, 
Kokuryo 高句麗  (Gaogouli). Even before the Chinese empire had been unified by Sui, 
Kokuryo’s ambition to control the entire Liaodong Peninsula was already obvious. This 
ambition was probably triggered by a gradually intensifying conflict within the Korean 
                                                     
2 Han Sheng 韓昇, “Suichao yu Gaoli Guanxi de Yanbian” <隋朝與高麗的演變>, Maritime History Studies 
《海交史研究》(1998), vol.2, pp.8-20. 
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Peninsula. To achieve its goal required that Kokuryo prevented the unification of the Chinese 
empire and the formation there of a centralized imperial government. The Turkish 
confederacy, therefore, was an important and powerful ally of the Koreans, while the Turks 
had their own interest in working with them. Therefore, if Kokuryo could be controlled, one 
of the major bases of anti-Chinese power in Northeast Asia would be eliminated; Tang would 
be able to prevent disloyal or disaffected Turkish elites from forming an alliance with Kokuryo; 
and the steppe/forest people who lived between Kokuryo and the Tang, like the Khitans and 
Xis, would be more obedient to Tang and less willing to ally with the Turks. These strategic 
considerations were already operative in the Sui their importance continued into the Tang. 
The grand strategy, however, never became functional because once the conquest of Kokuryo 
was accomplished during the reign of the third emperor of Tang, the Chinese were forced to 
pull out of the Korean Peninsula to confront a new and more imminent threat: Tibet (or Tubo 
吐蕃)3. The campaign did serve to further the incorporation of the remaining Northern Turks, 
however, even though their confederacy had already collapsed when the campaign was 
launched. What follows is an attempt to understand Tang-Turkish relations during the reigns 
of Li Yuan and Li Shimin in terms of the geopolitics of the East Asian heartland. What follows 
forms part of a larger project to rewrite the history of the struggle to re-found a stable and 
unified Chinese empire out of the military and ethnic confusion of the Six Dynasties period by 
                                                     
3 Chen Yinke 陳寅恪, Tangdai Zhengzhishi Luegao《唐代政治史略稿》(Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 
2009), pp.237-238. 
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enlarging our context to include the quest of Turks and Chinese to dominate the East Asian 
hinterland. 
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Chapter One: The Birth of Tang within the Turkish Political Core 
 
Before we actually enter the discussion about Tang’s strategies of incorporating the North 
Turkish confederacy into the empire, it is necessary first to acknowledge the political 
landscape at the fall of the Sui 隋: Tang surely wasn’t the only possible or even the most likely 
successor of the Sui, and during its early years, the regime’s safety was always survival was 
always in doubt. 
 
When emperor Yang Guang was murdered by his trusted subordinate, the inner vulnerabilities 
of the dynasty finally to the surface: When localism swallowed the whole empire, neither Yang 
Guang’s vast patronage across multiple religions  and regions nor his lavish yet highly 
fashioned lifestyle which that was meant to demonstrate the supreme power of the imperial 
family to his subjects could save the empire from total collapse. The majority of the core 
regions of the empire were now took over by local strongmen, bandits or elite of previous 
Southern Dynasties 4 . Many of them displayed a military sophistication, generosity, and 
personal charisma guaranteeing the willingness of their followers to die for them during 
chaotic years5. In the north and northwestern borderland, local powers also arose quickly and 
                                                     
4 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.53, pp.2207–2226; vol.54, pp.2234–2244; vol.55, pp.2252–2255, p.2260-2262; vol.56, 
pp.2263–2269, pp.2273–2275.  
5 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.53, pp.2234–2244; vol.55, pp.2252–2255; vol.56, pp.2266–2269. 
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gained their independence6.  
 
As the rivals within the shattered empire fought each other to death, another political core 
which settled in the Mongolian steppe, gradually became influential. After Qimin Khan 啟民
可汗, one of the leaders of the Northern Turkish confederacy who devoted his loyalty to 
emperor Yang Jian 楊堅 (Sui Wendi 隋文帝) and gained support from Sui, confederacy began 
to regain its strength7. Throughout the two succeeding khans, so far there are no records 
about major turmoils nor natural disasters, which may indicate that the confederacy had 
gained a valuable break. Although Sui Shu, Jiu Tang Shu, and Xin Tang Shu suggest that the 
confederacy was taking advantages of the turmoil within the Chinese empire8, which was 
obviously true, Shibi Khan, the successor of Qimin Khan, had already demonstrated an ability 
to challenge the sole authority of the Son of Heaven when he led the cavalry to surround Yang 
Guang at Yanmen 雁門9. Clearly, when the confederacy had passed to the next generation, its 
strength did not derive from its exploitation of Sui’s weakness, and the core of the Turkish 
confederacy had been established before the Chinese empire descended into chaos. 
 
With the shattered of Sui, The Northern Turkish confederacy made a play to replace China as 
                                                     
6 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.55, pp.2245–2247, pp.2248–2251, pp. 2256–2258; vol.56, p.2280–2281. 
7 Wei Zheng 魏徵, Sui Shu《隋書》(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1973), vol.84, pp.1872–1875. 
8 Sui Shu, vol.84, p.1878; Jiu Tang Shu, vol.194, p.5153; Xin Tang Shu, vol.215, p.6028.  
9 Sui Shu, vol.84, p.1876. 
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the political core of Northeast Asia. With the upper hand on Mongolian steppe and in the 
politics of north China, the confederacy successfully built up patron-vessel relations with 
multiple warlords by granting khan titles and wolfs head banners symbolizing the rulers’ 
authorities in Turkish political term10, and even protected Yang Guang’s empress and a male 
scion of the Sui Royal family, granting him the title “King of Sui”11. Since this “King” had his 
own court and subjects12, we can’t simply take him as a mere puppet. However, the ambitions 
of the confederacy were now clear: all personnel of north China, no matter their immediate 
loyalties, would derive their authority from the confederacy. 
 
Before we begin our discussion about Tang and its position within the changing relation 
between core and periphery in Northeast Asia, there are two issues require our attention. 
First of all, although the confederacy granted multiple Turkish titles to many warlords of north 
China, there is no evidence to suggest that there was a hierarchy of these titles. The only 
hierarchy, as we’ve already discussed, existed between the confederacy and the warlords 
below it. This meant that the confederacy wanted to keep north China in separation13. A 
similar strategy was also used by Sui since a unified power on the steppe would always be a 
                                                     
10 Wang Zhenping, Tang China in Multi-Polar Asia: A History of Diplomacy and War (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2013), p.15. 
11 Jiu Tang Shu, Vol. 194a, p.5154.  
12 Jiu Tang Shu, Vol. 194a, p.5154. 
13 Lin Enxian 林恩顯, “Tujue Dui Sui Tang Liangdai De Fenhua Zhengce” <突厥對隋唐兩代的分化政策>, Tujue 
Yanjiu《突厥研究》(Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu Yinshuguan, 1988), pp.281–283. 
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threat to the Chinese empire14. For the confederacy, the purpose of using the strategy can be 
folded: it can drain resources more easily from north China through looting and extortion15, 
and, as some historians suggest, it can prevent the birth of a unified Chinese empire hostile 
to the Turks16. The second issue is closely related to the first one: Although many warlords 
sought for Turkish assistance, the remaining sources suggest that the confederacy seems more 
interested in connecting warlords from regions which had territorial connections with the 
confederacy17. For those who located a farther south, like Wang Shichong 王世充, the ex-Sui 
courtier and warlord who occupied Luoyang 洛陽, communications indeed existed but were 
less regular18. As for those who located in the southern region of Yangzi River, no sources 
suggest the Turks were even in contact. From this, we can see that the Turks were attempting 
to carve out of parts of north China an expanded periphery to the core of the steppe. Anyone 
beyond this periphery was in fact beyond its concern, and the argument that the main goal of 
the confederacy was to prevent the unification of a Chinese empire is an exaggeration: The 
confederacy was more interested in keeping a Chinese empire from expanding into the north 
                                                     
14 “Suitang Liangdai Dui Tujue de Lijian Zhengce” <隋唐兩代對突厥的離間政策>, Tujue Yanjiu, p.245. 
15 Lin Enxian, “Tujue Dui Sui Tang Liangdai De Fenhua Zhengce”, Tujue Yanjiu, pp.285–288. 
16 Lin Enxian, “Tujue Dui Sui Tang Liangdai De Fenhua Zhengce”, Tujue Yanjiu, p.288. 
17 Lin Enxian, “Tujue Dui Sui Tang Liangdai De Fenhua Zhengce”, Tujue Yanjiu, p.290. 
18 Xin Tang Shu, vol.215a, p.6030; Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.188, pp.64-65.  
Xin Tang Shu mentions that during the third year of Wude, Wang Shichong’s ambassador, Wang Wensu 王文
素, encouraged Xieli Khan to support Yang Zhengdao. Zizhi Tongjian suggests that during the third year of Wude, 
the confederacy sent Ashina Jieduo 阿史那揭多 to present horses to Wang Shichong and asked for a marriage. 
Shichong married a female member from his family to this Turkish nobleman. Within the same year, the 
confederacy secretly sent ambassador(s) to meet Shichong. The ambassador(s) was discovered and killed by Li 
Xiyu 李襲譽, a Tang general. It seems that the confederacy and Wang Shichong began their communications at 
around the third year of Wude, Tang soon discovered the relationship between the two and put an end to it since 
there are no further evidences to prove that the communications were still there after the Turkish ambassador’s 
death. 
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Chinese borderlands than in preventing a unified Chinese empire. 
 
What about Tang? When Li Yuan decided to rise up his own flag, he was stationing at Taiyuan
太原, a frontier fort defending against potential Turkish assaults. As an established military 
commander with experience countering nomadic attacks and trained his cavalry in nomadic 
style19, Li Yuan clearly understood his position: He had to build up relation with the Turkish 
confederacy like other warlords had done20. Previous research suggests that Li Yuan had no 
choice in this matter, since Taiyuan was within the easy reach of the Turks, he needed to make 
sure that the great Khan and his followers were satisfied so they would remain on his side 
when the main troop of Taiyuan was marching into Guanzhong 關中21, the capital area of Sui. 
Scholars suggest that although there was a lack of sources, it’s acceptable to believe that Li 
Yuan was also demanded by the confederacy to receive a wolf head banner (and perhaps, a 
Turkish title) as an indicator of his vassalship to the Turks22. Interestingly, Li Yuan’s second son, 
Li Shiming, seems to have sworn a blood oath with, and became the brother of a Turkish 
nobleman. Chen Yinke 陳寅恪 suggests that since the oath was sworn in Turkish way, Li 
                                                     
19 Xin Tang Shu, vol.1, pp.1–21. 
20 Li Shutong 李樹桐, “Tang Gaozu Chengchen Yu Tuju Kaobian” <唐高祖稱臣於突厥考辨>, Tangshi Kaobian
《唐史考辨》(Taipei: Taiwan Zhonghua Shuju, 1965), pp.13-18. 
21 Huang Yuese 黃約瑟, “Luelun Litang Qibing Yu Tujue Guanxi” <略論李唐起兵與突厥關係>, Shihuo Yuekan
《食貨月刊》(1988), vol.16, nos.11 -12, pp.434-445. Howard J. Wechsler, “The Founding of the Tang Dynasty: 
Kao-tsu (reigh 618 - 626)”, in Sui and Tang China 589 – 906, vol.3, pt.1 of The Cambridge History of China (edited 
by Denis C. Twitchett, pp.150 – 187, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp.181–182. 
22 Wang Zhenping, Tang China in Multi-Polar Asia, p.17. 
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Shimin was formally accepted by other Turkish elites as one of them23. If this was really the 
case, Li Shimin’s Turkish identity would surely give him the authority to replace the great khan 
and ruled the steppe in the future. Chen’s judgment may be an exaggeration, yet his basic idea 
is compelling: In the very beginning of dynasty building, Tang and its founding family were 
inextricably linked with the confederacy’s ruling class. From a Turkish perspective, as 
subordinates who received recognition and status in exchange for gifts of protection to the 
great khan, Li Yuan - and, perhaps, Li Shimin, was well as other warlords - were all included 
among the rightful competitors for power in north China. 
 
After Li Yuan settled down in Guanzhong, his interests gradually began to conflict with those 
of the confederacy. As we have discussed before, the confederacy regarded itself as the 
overlord of the area, which was why it was willing to shelter other defeated warlords24, to 
appoint their successors25, or have someone killed if he tried to escape from its authority26. 
However, this Turkish overlordship became the greatest threat to Li Yuan as the new emperor 
turned to the conquest to the old territory of Sui.  
 
                                                     
23 Chen Yinke, “Lun Tanggaozu Chengchen Yu Tuju Shi” 論唐高祖稱臣於突厥事, Lingnan Journal 《嶺南學報》
(1951), 11:2, pp.8–9. 
24 For example, Liu Heita 劉黑闥 searched for protection from the confederacy after he was defeated by Tang 
troopes (Jiu Tang Shu, vol.55, p.2260). 
25  For example, Yuan Junzhang 苑君璋 was appointed by the confederacy to lead Liu Wuzhou’s 劉武周 
troopes after Liu’s death (Jiu Tang Shu, vol.55, p.2255). 
26 For example, Liu Wuzhou and Song Jingang 宋金剛 was killed by Turkish cavalry after the confederacy found 
out that the two tried to run away from Turkish control (Jiu Tang Shu, vol.55, p.2254). 
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With the rivals within modern day Hebei 河北 and Shanxi 山西 were largely put to rest, the 
vassalship between Tang and the confederacy went completely sour. During the reign of Li 
Yuan, Turkish cavalry harassed the new-born empire almost every year27, sometimes with help 
from independent borderland warlords, at other times with Tang rivals who had fled Tang’s 
persecution. The scale of, and harm inflicted by these operations are impossible to estimate 
due to the lack of statistics and detailed descriptions, but we do know that in many cases Tang 
troops absorbed these attacks rather passively and that operations by Tang troops in response 
were few28.  
 
The seriousness of Turkish assaults can also be proved by one court discussion between Li 
Yuan, his elder sons, and his most trust worthies29. In the seventh year of Wude 武德七年, as 
multiple sources suggest, advisors estimated that if Li Yuan could burn down the current 
capital and move the capital away from Chang’an 長安  to somewhere south of Mount 
Zhongnan 終南山, the direct threat to the empire would diminish, that the wealth of Chang’an 
was a temptation. Li Yuan actually accepted the advice and sent a commissioner to secure 
possible locations for the new capital. We don’t know which spot suited Li Yuan, perhaps 
                                                     
27 Xin Tang Shu, vol.215, p.6031 and vol.1, pp.11-19; Jiu Tang Shu, vol.1, pp.13-15. Base on the dates in Xin Tang 
Shu and Jiu Tang Shu, we know that the relationship between Tang and the confederacy went sour at around the 
third year of Wude. After that, invasions occurred every year, sometimes twice a year. Most of the invasions 
occurred between June and August. The last invasion occurred in the ninth year of Wude, right after Li Shimin’s 
succession.  
28 Xin Tang Shu, vol.1, pp.11-19; Jiu Tang Shu, vol.1, pp.13-15. 
29 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.2, p.29; Xin Tang Shu, vol.215, p.6031; Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.191, p.117.  
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because the idea was finally abandoned, but we won’t be surprised if Li Yuan wanted to move 
to Fancheng 樊城  (modern day Hubei Fanxiang shi 湖北樊襄市 ) 30 . Fancheng had its 
geographic advantage: It located just beside Han River 漢水  and could connect with 
Hanzhong 漢中 through the waterway. Hanzhong was an agriculture-productive region 
protected by mountains and was less damaged during the turmoil at the end of Sui, which 
could nourish the new capital with its wealth. Fancheng was also fairly close to Luoyang, a 
strategic position for Sui (and later, Tang) to access to the southeast region of the empire. Yet 
Luoyang itself was not suitable to be the new capital at this moment due to the destruction 
brought by the bloody war between Wang Shichong and Li Shimin. During the debate, crown 
prince Li Jiancheng 李建成 and his younger brother Li Yuanji 李元吉 both supported Li 
Yuan’s decision, high officials like Xiao Yu 簫瑀, who thought it was infeasible, did not oppose 
it openly. Only Li Shimin argued that the empire should stand its ground at Chang’an, summon 
its troops, march into the steppe and fight. Afterward, he was criticized by his brothers as 
foolhardy. Of course, Li Shimin would later be portrayed by the official historians as hero and 
man with guts in contrast to his cowardly father and brothers. But since Li Yuan himself had a 
much longer military career than his sons, not to mention his experience in dealing with the 
confederacy, it seems more reasonable to believe that Li Shimin was actually the ignorant one. 
                                                     
30 While Jiu Tang Shu only gives us an ambiguous location: the south of Mt Zhongnan, Xin Tang Shu and Zi Zhi 
Tong Jian tell us more: Fan (Fangcheng) and Deng (Dengzhou 鄧州, modern day Henan Dengzhou Shi 河南鄧州
市) was two of the possible locations for the commissioner to investigate. 
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Aside from direct military assaults and supporting rivals to devastate Tang’s local rule, the 
Turkish hegemony also generated other related threats which Tang needed to face at the same 
time. One of these was the decrease in the population within the Chinese empire. Studies 
already suggest that after the great turmoil, the taxed, or taxable, population inherited by 
Tang was much lesser than that of Yang Jian’s reign31, and didn’t fully recover until the era of 
Li Zhi 李治 (Tang Gaozong 唐高宗) and Wu Zetian32. The decrease of taxed population along 
surely can not prove the decrease of general population since the former may only reflect the 
empire’s loss of control over its people instead of actual mortality, therefore the decrease in 
the general population shouldn’t be overly exaggerated33. However, the need for analyzing 
the influence of the confederacy requires us to go farther. Factors causing the decrease of the 
general population can be multiple: Yang Guang’s Korean campaigns can surely be counted as 
one of the factors since these all ended with total failure and many Sui troops paid their lives34. 
Aside from the campaign itself, many life-costly preparatory works took place in modern day 
Shandong 山東, where local populations also suffered from flood and food shortage35. As for 
Hebei, since it was the major gathering location of all of Sui army, the local population was 
mobilized to construct channel for transportation. It was said that since men were far from 
                                                     
31 David A. Graff, Medieval Chinese Warfare, 300 – 900 (New York: Routledge, 2002), p.183; Tang Changru 唐長
儒, Weijin Nanbeichao Suitangshi Sanlun《魏晉南北朝隋唐史三論》(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2011), p.228. 
32 Tang Changru, Weijin Nanbeichao Suitangshi Sanlun, pp.230 – 231. 
33  Dewin G. Pulleyblank, “Registration of Population in China in the Sui and Tang Periods”, Journal of the 
Economic and Social History of the Orient (1961), vol.4, pp.289–301. 
34 Sui Shu, vol.4, pp.82–83; Zi zhi Tong Jian, vol.181, pp.992–993. 
35 Sui Shu, vol.3, p.76; Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.181, pp.989–990. 
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enough to finish the work, women also joined the labor force36. The subsequent era of turmoil 
was another factors. Both modern day Henan 河南, Hebei and the southern region of Yangzi 
River were major battlefields37. As we’ve already seen, Li Yuan and his sons had a difficult time 
with their rivals Hebei and their seesaw battles were brutal. Still, another factor which is often 
neglected was the fact that many Han-Chinese, either been kidnaped by Turkish raiders or 
escaped to the confederacy in order to get away from the chaos, was under Turkish rule.  
 
Because of our lack of sources, the origins of the population under Turkish rule is unknown, 
but we may fruitfully speculate based on a set of deductions. Although Tang rivals were many, 
large-scale war was not an empire-wide phenomenon. Guanzhong, for example, was relatively 
undamaged during the warlords period; it remained under Sui control and subject to a speedy 
settlement under Li Yuan. Compare with other regions, the population in Guanzhong was 
relatively larger and, base on previous research, some farmers even couldn’t find sufficient 
farmland due to the density of population38. Besides Guanzhong, Hanzhong, Sichuan 四川39 
and at least part of Hubei 湖北 may also quite flourish, since no source suggests the presence 
of powerful warlords in that region or the occurrence of large-scale battles. Also, since Li Yuan 
considered moving the capital to the south of Mount Zhongnan, which Fancheng was almost 
                                                     
36 Sui Shu, vol.3, p.70; Zi Zhi Tong Jian, Vol.181, p.980. 
37 Tang Changru, Weijin Nanbeichao Suitangshi Sanlun, pp.230–231. Tang also considers that the situation of the 
southern regions of Yangzi River was relatively better than that of Henan and Hebei. 
38 Tang Changru, Weijin Nanbeichao Suitangshi Sanlun, p.231. 
39 Tang Changru, Weijin Nanbeichao Suitangshi Sanlun, pp.231–232.   
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surely within consideration, the preferred location and its surrounding areas should be 
relatively undamaged due to the fact that rebuilding a capital from stretch and destruction 
can be very costly, and the administrative costs of running the central bureaucratic system 
was not cheap. In the absence of large-scale destruction or warfare, we may assume, the 
motivation for flight or emigration would have been removed. Although natural disasters, 
famine or a lack of land can also motivate immigration, the extant sources are also silent. 
 
As we’ve already mentioned, modern day Hebei, Henan and the southern region of Yangzi 
River endured severe damage during the turmoil era so these areas can be considered as 
regions crawl with sangluan 喪亂, a particular term to describe the chaos that frequently used 
by the authors of the sources we can access. Although we can’t deny the possibility that some 
population might begin their journey from the southern region and went into Turkish realm, 
it seems more likely that the majority of the immigrants and the victims who were kidnapped 
by Turkish raiders came from regions like Hebei and Shanxi which were close to the 
confederacy and its influences. 
 
Apart from the origins of the refugees, we also do not know is their number, and when sources 
discuss the matter, the word “many” is always used40 . However, references to the total 
                                                     
40 For example: Xin Tang Shu, vol.215, p.6028; Jiu Tang Shu, vol.194, p.5153. 
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amount are more frequent than references to origins. As we’ve mentioned before, Yang 
Zhengdao 楊政道, a Sui royal family member, was protected by the confederacy. Sources 
suggest that the Turk allowed him to govern the Han-Chinese who lived within the 
confederacy and he subsequently had ten-thousand subjects under his command41. Obviously, 
we’re not sure about the sex ratio of these ten-thousand subjects, nor do we know that this 
ten-thousand subjects comprised the total number refugees within the confederacy. However, 
other sources suggest that the total population of Han-Chinese refugees maybe much more 
than ten-thousands. At the end of third year of Zhenguan (629 A.D.), the Bureau of 
Households 戶部 claimed that up to that moment, the total population of Han-Chinese who 
had returned from the confederacy to the empire’s control, including the Turks who had 
surrendered to Tang and other barbarians who were under the control of county – prefecture 
system was about one million and two hundred thousand42. Within this massive crowd of 
people, due to the lack of knowledge of the total amount of non-Han population, our 
calculation of the total amount of Han-Chinese is hardly precise. However, we are sure that 
these returned Han-Chinese were only those who were willing or capable to return, since 
sources also suggest that at the fifth year of Zhenguan (631 A.D.), commissioner(s) sent out 
                                                     
41 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.194, p.5154; Xin Tang Shu, vol.140, p.6029. 
42 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.2, p.37; Xin Tang Shu, vol.2, p.31; Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.193, p.165; Tong Dian, vol.200, p.5494. 
The discussions about this issue within these four sources are different. Jiu Tang Shu and Tong Dian mention 
about “Turkish people” and “other barbarians” at the same time, while Xin Tang Shu and Zi Zhi Tong Jian only 
mention about “other barbarians”. 
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by Li Shimin brought back another eighty thousand Han-Chinese43. 
 
Though we’re still not certain about the total number of Chinese refugees, it is clear that Yang 
Zhengdao’s ten thousand subjects were the tip of the iceberg and the actual total was large 
enough for Tang to take it seriously. During the entire era of Li Yuan’s reign (and the very early 
period of Li Shimin)44, the emperor kept on asking the confederacy to return those Han-
Chinese population and, if we compare the context of these demands to the context of the 
demands made by Mochuo Khan 默啜可汗 to Wu Zetian about seventy years later45, they 
are strikingly similar. In Mochuo’s case, Wu Zetian did finally return the Turkish population 
back to the second confederacy since she badly needed Turkish troops to suppress Khitan’s 
uprising, against whose troops the Chinese troops were no match. In Li Yuan’s cases, however, 
we are not clear whether the confederacy was willing to return the refugees, but we do know 
the return of massive Chinese population seems to have occurred only after the confederacy 
began to fall apart. 
 
Losing or gaining population, for both nomads and sedentary regimes, can generate multiple 
effects, the most important of which was the productivity and taxable income of the regime. 
                                                     
43 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.193, p.176; Xin Tang Shu, vol.2, p.32; Jiu Tang Shu, vol.3, p.41; Wang Qinruo 王欽若, Ce 
Fu Yuan Gui《冊府元龜》(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1960), vol.42, p.477. 
44 For example, during the ninth year of Wude, Li Shimin asked the confederacy to return the Han-Chinese 
population (Zizhi Tongjian, vol.192, p.137). 
45 Xin Tang Shu, vol.215, p.6045; Jiu Tang Shu, vol.194, pp.5168–5169. 
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As discussed, many refugees may come from modern day Hebei, which was one of the major 
crops-growing areas in north China46. With a large-scale decrease in the general population, 
it’s hard to imagine that regime could muster the strength to fight off its enemy. In fact, even 
after the fall of the confederacy and the return of some Han-Chinese population, the situation 
was still regarded as “registered households was not yet recovered and the granaries were 
not yet fully filled”47. The one who made such claim, Wei Zheng 魏徵, was trying to convince 
Li Shimin not to practice the Fengshan ritual, since the journey would require the provision of 
resources and labor which the empire was not able to afford. Of course, practicing Fengshan 
ritual was always an expensive undertaking, and might raise objections even during an age of 
peace and prosperity, and Wei Zheng was always a moralist (at least in public) who paid 
particular attention to Li Shimin’s self-indulgence; he may have been motivated to exaggerate 
the general poverty of the empire. However, his argument is somewhat trustworthy base on 
our previous discussions about population outflow. 
 
The lack of productivity of the new empire may also be observed in grain price. The sources 
suggest that at the very beginning of Zhenguan era, one dou 斗 of grain cost one pi 匹 of silk 
since the taxed population under government control was less than three million households48. 
                                                     
46 Tang Changru, Weijin Nanbeichao Suitangshi Sanlun, p.322. 
47 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.194, p.180. 
48 Tong Dian, vol.7, p.148; Xin Tang Shu, vol.51, p.1344. 
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We don’t know how many pi of silk should be paid for one dou of grain during Wude era, but 
it was highly unlike for the exchange would have been lower than that of Zhenguan’s. Also, 
we are not sure whether the exchange rate between grain and silk was regarded by 
contemporaries as unbearable, since the voice of commoners, who were directly affected by 
the price of grain, is unknown. Fortunately, one remaining source suggests that grain price 
became cheaper in the fourth year of Zhenguan. The author(s) of the source actually praised 
Li Yuan and Li Shimin for their hard work, which may indicate that their efforts did make lives 
of the commoners somewhat easier49. Interestingly enough, we should notice that the year in 
which the grain price began to go down was very close the year that the massive amount of 
population returned to the empire’s control (the third year of Zhenguan) and the confederacy 
began to fall apart. It seems somewhat unlikely that the price decrease was directly due to 
the return of this population, since resettling them and put them to work would have required 
some time. Nonetheless, the exact months/seasons of their return and the price decrease is 
left ambiguous in the sources, so there may be, in fact, a connection between the two events. 
 
Overall, from the previous discussion, we can see that Tang was born within the political 
sphere which the Turkish confederacy formed the core. The confederacy deployed its 
influence both directly and indirectly on Tang, placing great stress on Li Yuan’s ability to govern 
                                                     
49 Xin Tang Shu, vol.51, p.1344. 
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and rejuvenate the Chinese empire. In fact, both Li Yuan and Li Shimin openly expressed their 
relieve and happiness after the collapsed of the confederacy 50 , which indicated the 
seriousness of the threat which the confederacy posed. Li Yuan even held a private banquet 
and invited his relatives, trusted companions, and Li Shimin in celebration51. Li Shimin barely 
saw his father after the Coup at Xuanwu Gate 玄武門之變, furious over the succession52, yet 
he showed up for Li Yuan’s private banquet and the two are reported to have enjoyed 
themselves, evidence that the “Turkish problem” affected both equally.  
 
Up to this point, a question may arise in our minds: If Tang was much weaker than the 
confederacy in the very beginning of its establishment, how could it overcome its inferior 
position and gain recognitions from at least some of the Turkish elites? Convention narrations 
tend to treat Western Han and Tang similarly as two dynasties that extended their authorities 
and power into the steppe. However, there were differences between the two. One of the 
major differences was that when Liu Che 劉徹 (emperor Wudi of Western Han 漢武帝) 
dragged the whole empire into the war against Xiongnu 匈奴, he had inherited enormous 
resources from his forebears. Li Yuan, Li Shimin and Tang dynasty, however, did not have such 
                                                     
50 Song Minqiu 宋敏求, Tang Da Zhaoling Ji《唐大詔令集》(Beijing: Shanwu Yinshuguan, 1959), vol.83, p.477;  
Ce Fu Yuan Gui, vol.84, p.987; Wang Yinglin 王應麟, Yu Hai《玉海》(Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1988), 
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51 Zizhi Tongjian, vol.193, p.168. 
52 Li Shutong, “Xuanwumenzhibian Jiqi Dui Zhengzhi de Yingxiang” <玄武門之變及其對政治的影響>, Tangshi 
Kaobian, pp.154-191. 
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good fortune, and their huge disadvantages would lead the Tang government on a unique 
course incomparable with the Han.  
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Chapter Two: Tang and the Collapse of the Turkish Confederacy 
 
In the previous chapter, we have seen that when the Northern Turkish confederacy was in its 
heyday, the Tang empire lacked the strength to defend itself. Indeed, Tang troops did 
sometimes repel Turkish attacks successfully, yet they were not capable of pursuing their 
victory deep into the confederacy. It would be justified to say that the newborn Tang was a 
profitable prey for the Turks, a place where they could arrive fully armed and leave with 
human captives and imperial bribes. In fact, when Li Shimin gave a public speech to some new 
recruits of the Tang garrison forces, encouraging them to train hard so that the people might 
again live in peace 53 , he was not merely showing his concern about the livelihood of 
commoners in the typical voice of a Confucian monarch, but also his distress concerning Tang’s 
relations with the confederacy that the young emperor had inherited from his predecessor. 
Yet, although Tang was surely at a competitive disadvantage, the confederacy also wasn’t 
without its weaknesses. As we shall discuss below, Tang was able to capitalize on these 
weaknesses and achieve its goal without subjecting the empire to large-scale and long-term 
military actions. 
 
According to Li Feng’s study, Guanzhong has its geographical advantage and disadvantage as 
                                                     
53 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.192, p.137. 
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the power base of any regime. With its political center in Chang’an, Guanzhong was protected 
from invasion from the east, but since there were no major natural barriers on its western and 
northwestern sides, an invasion from either of these directions could be launched relatively 
easily54. Unfortunate for Tang, the three most powerful warlords to the west and northwest 
of Guanzhong - Xue Ju 薛舉, Li Gui 李軌, and Liang Shidu 梁師都 - all had connections with 
the confederacy. Both Xue Ju and Li Gui was defeated during the early years of Li Yuan’s reign, 
which certainly relieved some of the burdens on the fledgling regime. Only Liang Shidu 
managed to hold out until he was assassinated by his cousin, who finally surrendered to Tang 
and ended the conflict. Due to his uniqueness, Liang Shidu’s “career” and, more importantly, 
his relations with the confederacy must be briefly examined. 
 
According to his biographies in Jiu Tang Shu and Xin Tang Shu, Liang Shidu came from a locally 
family of Shuofang county 朔方郡 which had flourished for generations. During Yang Guang's 
reign, he joined the Sui garrison army and serve as a mid-level officer in his hometown55. We 
know that before Yang Guang started his Korean campaign, he greatly expanded the quota of 
recruits56. Warlords such as Liu Wuzhou and Dou Jiande had all joined up at this time and 
gained their formidable military experiences during the campaign57. Since we don’t know 
                                                     
54 Li Feng, Landscape and Power in Early China: The Crisis and Fall of the Western Zhou 1045-771 BC 
(Cambridge University Press: 2006), pp.3-4. 
55 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.56, p.2280; Xin Tang Shu, vol.87, p.3730. 
56 Sui Shu, vol.24, p.686. 
57 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.55, p.2252; vol.54, p.2234. Xin Tang Shu, vol.86, p.3711; vol.85, p.3696. 
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when Liang Shidu joined the garrison army, nor did his biographies mention anything about 
his military career after he joined, we cannot determine whether he had also played a part in 
the Korean campaign. Yet since it was clear that he came from a typical border elite family, he 
probably had had some basic military skills before he joined the army, and his promotion as a 
mid-level officer may also relate to his local influences and knowledge of the borderland. 
 
At the thirteen years of Daye (618 A.D.), Liang Shidu gathered his gang and seized control of 
Shuofang county. After that, he proclaimed himself as “Grand Chancellor” (dachengxiang 大
丞相) and allied with the confederacy. In the same year, he proclaimed himself emperor of 
Liang 梁. Shibi khan, the great khan of the confederacy, sent him a wolf’s-head banner and 
granted him multiple titles. We should not be surprised to find Turkish titles among them. 
However, the title that interested us is Jieshi Tianzi 解事天子, which means “Son of Heaven 
who Deals with Affairs” or “Son of Heaven who Understands Affairs”. Although this title has a 
clear Chinese component (ie. Son of Heaven), we never see the other component or this 
combination of components in a Chinese context which may indicate that the title was a 
Turkish idea. Interestingly, among all the warlords, Shidu was the only one who not only 
received Turkish titles and wolf’s-head banner from the confederacy but also a title with the 
Sinic component which, as we shall see, indicates a closer relation between Liang and the 
great khan in comparison with the latter’s relations with the other warlords. 
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Since the newly built Liang regime was located on the northwest side of Guanzhong, a conflict 
between Liang and Tang became inevitable. Unlike some of the other warlords, however, 
there was no evidence to suggest that Liang Shidu had empire-wide ambitions. After he 
helped the confederacy to take over the control of “the southern side of the river bank” 
(henandi 河南地) and attacked Yanchuan county 鹽川郡, there were no records that attribute 
further large-scale aggressive operations to Liang58. His diffidence was not unique since the 
other Liang 涼 regime built by Li Gui similarly avoided further expansion once his regime 
became relatively secure. Li Gui’s biographies in Jiu Tang Shu and Xin Tang Shu suggest that 
he had a similar family background as Liang Shidu while also proclaiming himself emperor. 
During a discussion between Li Gui and his courtiers about whether he should abandon his 
imperial title and submit to Tang, at least one courtier suggested that since both Tang and 
Liang were independent states, Li Gui should leave Guanzhong to the Tang and even if Liang 
submitted to the Tang, it should retain the imperial title. Li Gui agreed with this courtier’s 
suggestion, and so, when he wrote to Li Yuan, he employed the words “Gui, your younger 
brother and subject, the emperor of the Great Liang” as his signature59. And like Liang Shidu, 
Li Gui built up connections with the confederacy to secure his position. 
 
In addition to this conservative character of both regimes, there was also another similarity 
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between the two. Although the military forces of both sides were sufficient for establishing 
their regimes, they appear significantly less powerful when they encountered Tang troops. 
This may be because of their lack of enthusiasm for expansion into Guanzhong and may reflect 
the fact that in most of the time, it was Tang that initiated hostilities. But it may also have 
something to do with the complexity of the borderland since the rulers were not the only 
players on the military or political board. Sources suggest that both generals and commoners 
often turned their back on their original rulers and submitted themselves to Tang when their 
own fortunes were in jeopardy60. One typical example was the betrayal of Li Gui by his own 
Sogdian forces, whose leader had a personal connection with Chang’an. The turnabout was 
key to the downfall of Li Gui’s Liang; after Tang took over the region, the Sogdian leader and 
his relative in Chang’an were both been generously rewarded61.  
 
As for Liang Shidu, his fate was no better than Li Gui’s; his subjects also betrayed him at the 
moment when they were most needed. Nonetheless, he held on for nine years longer than Li 
Gui had, which indicates that he may have had some advantages. As we have mentioned, Liang 
Shidu enjoyed a close relation with the confederacy, especially with the great khan. In the 
sixth year of Wude (623 A.D.), after suffering a severe defeat at the hands of Tang troops and 
the defection of his two generals along with their soldiers and territory, Liang Shidu asked for 
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help and Xieli Khan came to the rescue. From Western Han dynasty, Shuofang county had 
functioned as the strategic points in the northwest defense of Guanzhong, but because it 
lacked major geographical barriers, it served as a springboard for both the nomadic and 
sedentary powers62. With Liang Shidu’s help, the confederacy could easily enter Tang territory. 
We may assume - although the sources do not speak about this – that the confederacy could 
pull back their cavalry without much effort if Tang troops gained the upper hand since the 
gatekeeper of Guanzhong was on the Turkish side. Then the situation described in the 
previous chapter would take shape: Tang could hold off the attack, but could not gain any 
ground. Turkish aid relieved the pressure on Liang Shidu, and after the sixth year of Wude (623 
A.D.), there were no major attacks on Shuofang from Tang, and Tang had to deal with 
increasingly severe and more frequent Turkish assaults. 
 
We can see that Liang Shidu possessed neither an imperial-wide ambition nor solid military 
or political power. His “independence” largely depended on Turkish recognition and military 
support. Taking Liang Shidu as their gateway to the south, Turkish troops, once resupplied, 
might then easily launch their assaults from Shuofang. And if the Turks managed to defend 
this portal, Tang’s success in the steppe would always be in doubt. In the second year of 
Zhenguan (628 A.D.), Li Shiming tried to persuade Liang Shidu to surrender, taking advantage 
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31 
 
of inner turmoil in the confederacy. But Liang Shidu turned down the emperor’s offer, putting 
his faith again in Turkish support63. Of course, as we’ve mentioned, the result was not a happy 
one for Liang Shidu, and although both he and Li Shimin were familiar with Turkish affairs, the 
latter better appreciated the vulnerabilities at the heart of the structure of power of the 
Turkish confederates.  
 
Although the confederacy was in its heyday, the regime under the rule of Xieli Khan was not 
without problems. Extant Chinese sources suggest that the solidity of Xieli khan’s rule was 
being undermined by his preference for non-Turkish personnel (i.e. Sogdian-Iranians and Han-
Chinese) which alienated his fellow tribesmen. His people were unhappy and there was talk 
of disloyalty64. Our sources lack detail, yet they point out a key weakness of the confederacy 
which Tang had nothing to do with. Scholars have long known that Inner Asian empires had 
their political tradition distinctive from the Chinese. Although the rulers all came from noble 
clans, neither the ruler nor his clan could act as the absolute authority on the steppe. A ruler’s 
power depended on support from other tribal leaders and commoners whose aid and 
subordination was conditional65. In Xieli Khan’s case, he certainly had the power to appoint 
non-Turkish personnel to be his “courtiers”, yet doing so violated the interests and 
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expectations of the tribes’ interests was surely unwise.  
 
We don’t know exactly what positions or responsibilities Xieli Khan granted to his non-Turkish 
personnel, nor the nature of their power, but we may gain some appreciation for the politics 
by looking at Zhao Deyan 趙德言, a Han-Chinese Sui official who had gained the trust of Xieli 
Khan and acted as the great khan’s major advisor. Importantly, Zi Zhi Tong Jian mentions that 
before Zhao Deyan had joined the confederacy, the customary politics of the Turks had been 
modest and operating smoothly. This observation fits nicely with what previous studies of the 
politics of Inner Asian empires have revealed, which is that all important positions were 
inherited and monopolized by certain lineages66. After Zhao gained an opportunity to “wield 
his own power/authority” (zhuanqiweifu 專其威福), he changed many of the old political 
customs and disturbed the people. How did Zhao gain his opportunity and power? Since Zi Zhi 
Tong Jian was written by Sima Guang as a history textbook for Song emperors, he adopted the 
moral vocabulary of orthodox historical narration, which precluded the assignment of blame 
to the sovereign, whether emperor or khan. Sima Guang can only focus on Zhao Deyan’s 
“selfishness” for the destruction of the regime. Yet while Zhao may have won some respect 
and support from Turkish tribesmen by his personal charisma, a key features of leadership in 
Inner Asian societies, Zhao’s status as an outsider without connections to a noble Turkish 
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lineage or chief suggests that his position of authority derived entirely from Xieli Khan, and 
his activities represented the will of the sovereign. Moreover, if we take into consideration 
Xieli’s documented mistrust toward other Turks (i.e. Turkish elites) and his inclusion of 
Sogdian-Iranians in his personal retinue, we must conclude that Xieli Khan was attempting to 
overcome the traditional Turkish constraints on the authority of the sovereign and centralize 
his power. As we know, he failed. 
 
In addition to the decentralized nature of power in Inner Asian confederations, the economic 
foundations of this power, pastoralism, was highly vulnerable to natural disasters on the 
steppe 67 . Extensive drought or heavy snow could devastate the livestock. As we have 
mentioned in the first chapter, there are no signs of natural disasters during the supremacy of  
Chuluo khan and Shibi khan. Xieli Khan inherited the position from two of his predecessors, 
but not their good luck. Sources suggest that heavy snow fell between approximately the 
eighth year of Wude and the first year of Zhenguan (625 – 627 A.D.), causing large numbers 
of animal casualties and people suffered from hunger and freeze68. And we can we can regard 
this period as the beginning of the decline of both the confederacy and the power of the great 
khan. Still, we must acknowledge that Xieli Khan was still able to mobilize a huge army of 
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cavalry and “travel” all the way to Chang’an soon after Li Shiming’s succession, though the 
young emperor described these troops as undisciplined, impetuous, lacking the will to fight, 
and only caring about soliciting bribes69. Even Zhangsun Wuji 長孫無忌, the elder brother of 
the empress and one of the emperor’s trusted lieutenants, opposed the new emperor’s 
proposal to attack the confederacy when answering Li Shimin’s inquisition. Referencing 
Confucian ideals, Wuji stated that since the empire had re-established a truce treaty with the 
Turks after the invasion of the ninth year of Wude (626 A.D.) and have never attacked by them 
since, it would be an act of betrayal, not to mention a waste of resources, for the Son of 
Heaven to send out his troops without having been invaded first, as well as a pointless burden 
paced on the shoulders of his people, contravening the “Way of Kings”. Therefore, although Li 
Shimin felt strongly that this was his chance to deal a final blow to the great khan and his 
evidently weakened and undisciplined cavalry, he acceded to Wuji’s advice70. In this case, 
considering that Xieli Khan has just displayed his power under the city wall of Chang’an, 
Zhangsun Wuji’s moral objections and Li Shimin’s humble reaction to his courtier's advice 
seem to be the ideological expression of a decision that was based on strategic considerations. 
 
The cold weather also had more indirect, but equally negative, effects. According to Nicola Di 
Cosmo’s brilliant study of the organization of Inner Asian empires, he concludes that it would 
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have been tremendously expensive for the great khan to maintain his cavalry forces at full 
capacity, since it would have required able-bodied male to devote less of their time on their 
livelihoods and more to fighting, resulting in a general decrease of production. To make up for 
this decrease, the great khan would have been desperately in need of money or 
commodities71. As we mentioned, bribery and looting were the preferred methods of the 
confederacy, and the desperate need for resources may account for the indiscipline and chaos 
of Xieli’s troops recognized by Li Shimin. The cold weather, in fact, had made everyone on the 
steppe short of resources, and Xieli was forced to extract resources from other tribes, which 
were also in bad shape. Taxation increased, generating hatred and discord. And since the 
Xieli’s forces were culled from multiple tribes, discord led directly to the weakening of his 
military power72. And with the cohesion and strength of the great khan’s power now in doubt, 
other political powers subordinated to the confederacy began to challenge Xieli’s authority. 
Xue-Yantuo 薛延陀 was one of these. As sources and other scholarship suggest73, since Xue-
Yantuo located at the north of Gobi Desert, their uprising against the confederacy blocked 
Xieli’s leeway so he couldn’t flee to the north if dangerous accrued. Tang formed an alliance 
with Xue–Yantuo in the second year of Zhenguan (628A.D.) 74 , thereby encircling the 
confederacy. 
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Aside from the economic weakness of the confederacy in these years, the conflict between 
male members of the ruling clan also weakened its solidarity and strength. As sources clear 
show, Xieli Khan was the younger brother of Chuluo Khan, who had inherited the position of 
great khan from his elder brother, Shibi Khan75. Following his succession, Xieli appointed 
Shibi’s son, Ashina shebobi 阿史那什鉢苾, as Tuli Khan. Been a lesser khan, Tuli was charged 
with controlling the Khitan (or Qidan 契丹), Xi 奚, Mohe 靺鞨 and other steppe/forest people 
of Northeast Asia. His personal headquarter was located in the east of the confederacy, which 
was close to Tang’s Youzhou 幽州. Although the military power of Khitan and Xi in this period 
is unknown, we do know from descriptions of the battles between Zhou and Khitan troops 
during Wu Zetian’s reign that the Khitans were very skillful warriors76. The appointment of Tuli, 
therefore, was significant, holding out the promise of potential alliances and troops.  
 
All this came to a head when the Turks prepared to launch a massive invasion in the seventh 
year of Wude (624 A.D.). To defend itself, the court compelled Li Shimin to lead an expedition 
force. Records indicate that heavy rain blocked the roads, preventing the transportation of 
supplies, that the soldiers became tired and afraid, and that their weapons and equipment 
were in bad shape, causing anxiety in the court and in the field. Li Shimin, in full battle dress, 
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was forced to negotiate personally with the two khans in order to prevent a likely defeat77. 
During the conference, Li Shimin tried to provoke a conflict between the two khans by claiming 
that since Tuli Khan had already negotiated with Tang before the invasion, he was betraying 
the Tang by joining his uncle. We don’t know whether Li Shimin’s words are credible, but after 
hearing the emperor’s charges, Xieli Khan is recorded to have been very worried after hearing 
such an accusation and began to be suspicious about his nephew’s motivation. Afterward, Li 
Shimin sent his subordinates to convince Tuli Khan not to attack. The latter was pleased and, 
when his uncle proposed an attack, he declined. We can see that Tuli Khan retained significant 
autonomy in negotiating with other powers even when that negotiation upset the strategy of 
the great khan. Conflicts within the ruling elites, like this one, was another characteristic of 
Inner Asian polities. The great khan could not force, nor did he have the authority to compel, 
his subordinates to present a united front in diplomatic negotiations78.  
 
According to Jiu Tang Shu, after this unsuccessful invasion, the conflict between Xieli Khan and 
Tuli Khan gradually intensified. In the second year of Zhenguan (628 A.D.), Tuli Khan invited 
Tang to attack Xieli Khan because of conflicts with his uncle, although it seems that Li Shimin 
didn’t respond to this offer. In the third year of Zhenguan (629 A.D.), Tuli Khan, along with his 
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tribe, defected to Tang. This happened before Tang launched the assault on Xieli Khan79. If 
Xieli Khan had his nephew on his side, the outcome of the battle would be hard to predict. Or, 
perhaps, in the face of this alliance, Tang would not have risked and expeditionary force at all.  
 
Tuli Khan was not the only member of Ashina clan who had the potential to have conflicts 
with Xieli Khan. Ashina Momo 阿史那摸末, probably one of Xieli Khan’s closest relatives who 
was given the position of “She”射 with the authority to command troops, abandoned Xieli 
Khan with his troops and subjects approximately in the first or the second year of Zhenguan 
(627 – 628 A.D.). A Tang general plotted to exploit the tension between the two. Xieli Khan 
sent out his men to attack Momo80. With the great khan’s troops in his front and Tang’s troops 
at his back, Momo had no choice but to surrender himself and his subjects to the Tang81.  
Similarly, another Turkish nobleman, Ashina She’er 阿史那社尔, left Xieli Khan and returned 
to his tribe after the great khan refused to take his advice not to attack other tribes82. She’er 
later became one of Li Shimin’s most trusted generals, and his military talent and the loyalty 
to the Son of Heaven was widely praised83. 
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In the long run, the secession of Turkish nobles from the Ashina clan weakened the great 
khan’s power. When Tang general Zhang Gongjin 張公謹 argued that the confederacy was 
easily defeated, he pointed to the disunity among Ashina elites and the ignorance of Xieli Khan 
as two of the most important reasons84. However, Xieli Khan might have his own story to tell. 
According to Thomas J. Barfield, the Turks, unlike the Xiongnu state after Modu’s 冒頓 rule, 
lacked stable rules of succession. Every male heir of the great khans preserved the right to 
fight for the highest position85. We may, therefore, better appreciate the difficulty faced by 
Xieli Khan: the stability of his position required the support of his closest relatives, yet these 
noblemen were also his greatest threat. The contradiction demonstrates the inherent 
centrifugal tendency of the Turkish court; the best way for Tang to overthrown its Turkish 
overlord was to wait for opportunities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
84 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.68, p.2507; Xin Tang Shu, vol.89, p.3756. 
85  Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757 (Cambridge: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1992), pp.133-136. 
40 
 
Chapter Three: The Means of Incorporating the Northern Turks into the Tang 
 
The fourth year of Zhenguan (630 A.D.) was surely a year worth remembering. Although the 
Northern Turkish confederacy already had shown signs of disunity, it was this year that Tang 
could finally take a break. Even though Xieli Khan was still on the run and it would be another 
month before he surrendered, Li Shimin was already overwhelmed by the news of victory that 
he made an empire-wide announcement to all his subjects in February and invited them to 
share his happiness.  
 
Interestingly, in his announcement, the emperor admitted that because of the significant 
power differential between the Chinese empire and the confederacy when the Turks were 
strong, the empire was not able to make further attacks on its enemy except holding its ground 
and let the people recovered from previous chaos. He also claimed that he showed his mercy 
to the Turks, and therefore their commoners and chiefs were arriving to offer their obedience. 
The land of barbarians was now in a depression and its central authority neutralized, all 
without needing to send large armies and talented generals deep into the steppe, as Han 
dynasty had done86. It is obvious that Li Shimin had hit upon a great truth: the confederacy 
had been corrupted from within, a process in which the Tang had not played a significant role. 
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Ultimately, however, Tang did send out troops to crush Xieli Khan, who could no longer count 
on assistance from the core members of his court.  
 
In the absence of large–scale warfare, both the Chinese and Turkish populations now had time 
to recover. After Xieli Khan’s downfall and the collapse of the confederacy, many Turkish, both 
elites and commoners, sought protection from Xue-Yantuo, while others, roughly a hundred 
thousand of them, surrendered to the Tang instead87. But Xue–Yantuo remained a potential 
enemy and source of attraction, and the incorporation and settlement of the surrendered 
Turks therefore became a “national security” issue. Xue-Yantuo had already demonstrated its 
independence from Xieli Khan and its ambition to organize a new confederacy. It certainly 
would not benefit Tang if the empire failed to accommodate the surrendered Turks, who could 
simply flee and join Xue-Yantuo. On the other hand, even if they did not, a population of one 
hundred thousand free-floating Turks was a sizeable force and might someday return as 
enemies. Therefore, Li Shimin and his courtiers had to come up with an effective strategy for 
settling the Northern Turkish defectors, both elite and commoner. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, economic difficulties and the widespread poverty were 
significant factors undermining the confederacy. Nourishing the Turkish people, therefore, 
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ought to be an immediate concern, but this idea was neither widely accepted nor the only 
option. In the fourth year of Zhenguan (630 A.D.), the emperor gathered his major courtiers 
to work out a proper plan. According to the sources, three different plans were presented88. 
The first suggested that all the Turkish defectors should be moved deep into the empire and 
forced to abandoned nomadic way of life and practice farming. Supporters of the plan 
asserted that all the Northern Turks should be turned into Han-Chinese, thereby increasing 
the registered (and taxable) population of the empire. This plan was supported by the majority 
of the officials, though its primary advocators of the plan are not mentioned. A second plan 
suggested that the defectors, as barbarians, were untrustworthy and should be sent back to 
their homeland. This plan was proposed by Wei Zheng, one of Li Shimin’s most influential 
officials. While crueler than the first proposal, it was also highly economical. A third plan 
proposed that the defectors should be settled in Ordos region and the northern edge of Loess 
Plateau, which were more friendly to the nomadic way of life, especially horse herding, but 
could also sustain some agriculture. The idea behind this plan was to nourish the Turks in their 
own customs and in the hope that they would show their gratitude by helping Tang to defend 
its borders, or, at the very least, not rebel. 
 
The description of this council is couched in the moral language typical of traditional Chinese 
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historical writing. The main characters all emphasize the differences between the civilized 
Chinese and uncivilized barbarians, the inevitable negative consequences that come from 
these differences, and the historical experience, both good and bad, of previous dynasties. 
And the defenders of the first plan argued that the Turks had surrendered because they had 
nowhere to flee to, not because they were drawn to the moral charisma of the emperor or to 
the superior civilization of the Chinese. But behind this Confucianized narration, it is easy to 
see the importance of strategic considerations for all participants. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
the shattering of Sui and the chaos that ensued resulted in a significant loss of the population 
at large and of the registered population in particular. The emperor was committed to 
retrieving the Han-Chinese populations that had “leaked away” during the post-Sui chaos, and 
a majority of the courtiers supported the first plan in recognition of the desperate need to 
increase the registered population and taxable income of the empire. Whether Turkish 
defectors cared to be transformed by Chinese civilization or not, they could be put to farming 
and weaving in any case. The first plan, however, was impracticable. While the additional 
population certainly would have benefited the empire almost instantaneously, the defectors 
did, indeed, have another place to go: Xue-Yantuo. And even if they didn’t, the cost and risk 
of transferring this huge alien population to the counties and prefectures of modern-day 
Henan, as was proposed – far from their homeland in Mongolia – were too great. 
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Although the second plan was not supported by the majority of courtiers, it had been 
proposed by Wei Zheng and backed other by powerful officials, such as Dou Jing 竇靜 and Li 
Boyao李百藥. Under this plan, we can also detect the strain of pragmatism under a moralizing 
veneer. At first, Wei Zheng argued that Turks and Han-Chinese had in fact been enemies for 
generations, but because they had surrendered, it would be both uncivilized and immoral to 
eliminate them all. Yet he also thought it would be unwise to take them in, because barbarians 
were like beasts, they were obedience when weak, but would flee as soon as they had 
recovered. In the end, though, Wei Zheng also acknowledged practical considerations. The 
defectors were too many and if they were settled in a nurturing environment, their numbers 
would increase exponentially and pose a threat to the empire. He pointed out that the ruler 
of Jin 晉 had to pay a great price for not banishing the barbarians, suggesting that any cost-
savings envisioned by Li Shimin in the short run would cost the empire dearly in the long run. 
 
The arguments of Dou Jing and Li Boyao were equally pragmatic. Although Dou Jing did 
moralize that the Turks could neither be taught by the laws of the sages nor controlled by the 
laws of the empire, he argued, first, that the Turkish defectors would never forget their 
homeland, so it would be better to send them home now, and second, that the Turks should 
be allowed to govern Turks, but that the empire should choose their chiefs and marry them 
to women of the Chinese court. And according to Li Boyao, the best way to govern the Turks 
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was to utilize and manipulate the decentralized nature of steppe politics, keeping the power 
of each chief relatively weak and unable to attack or organize its neighbors. This way peace 
might be achieved. Dou’s pragmatic argument clearly derived from his experience in charge 
of military affairs at Bing Zhou 并州 (modern-day Taiyuan) during Li Yuan’s reign and his 
familiarity with border politics89.   
 
The majority of the courtiers whom we have considered so far shared a strategic and 
conservative outlook. They all sought to derive actual benefit for the empire from the 
defectors or spent as least as possible on dealing with them, and these practical 
considerations took precedence over moral rhetoric. Before we examine Li Shimin’s final 
decision, it’s necessary to consider the third plan proposed by Wen Yanbo 溫彥博. 
 
Among all the courtiers, he was the only one who suggested – in language that was as 
sophisticated and persuasive as Wei Zheng’s - that the empire should show mercy to its 
Turkish defectors. Wen Yanbo, too, couched practical considerations in moralizing language. 
He claimed that the virtue of the Sage Kings nourished everything between Heaven and Earth, 
so how could the empire abandon the Turks in their time of need? To do so would be to 
contradict the Way of Heaven. Also, based on Confucius’ idea of “teaching without 
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classification” (youjiaowulei 有教無類), Wen Yanbo argued that if the Tang saved the Turks 
from extinction by granting them a livelihood and teaching them moral values, they should be 
willing to serve the empire. Contradicting Wei Zheng’s prediction of the inevitable rebellion 
of Turks settled within the empire, Wen Yanbo insisted that the Southern Xiong’nu never 
betrayed the Eastern Han after they had been allowed to settle in Ordos region and that they 
continued to serve as military allies of the dynasty for many years. 
 
It appears that Wen Yanbo’s position – settling the Turks within the empire – received no 
support during the debate. Yet, unusually, it was kept in the records, as if it had had great 
influence on the courtiers, which it didn’t, or alternatively on the emperor, because the 
emperor later chose to follow Wen’s advice. Yet I would argue that the position taken by Wen 
Yanbo in the debate was in fact the emperor’s position, a fact we may better appreciate by 
looking at Wen’s unique role in court politics. 
 
At the time of the debate, Wen Yanbo occupied the office of Prime Minister of the Secretariat 
(zhongshuling 中書令). The Secretariat (zhongshusheng 中書省) was one of the Three 
Departments and Six Ministries (sanshengliubu 三省六部 ) that made up the central 
government. Although the titles of these central bureaucrats had not been greatly changed 
since the beginning Tang, their actual powers, duties, and functions within Tang’s realpolitik 
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shifted from time to time. Generally speaking, in the upper half of the dynasty, the duty of the 
Secretariat was to put the decisions and ideas of the emperor down on the paper, 
transforming them into stylish prose. In early Tang, almost all the Prime Minister and Vice 
Minister of the Secretariat tended to have a close private relationship with the emperor. Some 
of the famous officials of early Tang who had served as Prime or vice Ministers in the 
Secretariat - Wen Yanbo and Ma Zhou 馬周 under Li Shimin, Xu Jingzong 許敬宗 and Li Yifu
李義府 under Li Zhi and Wu Zetian - were all blessed by the rulers with extra kindness and 
generosity 90 . Ironically, accounts of Xu Jingzong and Li Yifu were later put into “The 
Biographies of the Wicked” (jianchenzhuan <姦臣傳>) of Xin Tang Shu because the editors 
thought that both had abused the kindness and power granted to them by the emperor, 
contravening the Confucian ideal of loyal and honest official91. Yet our sources suggest that at 
the time they were in fact acting as the ruler’s “black gloves”, allowing the emperor to avoid 
confronting criticism directly. According to Sun Guodong’s 孫國棟 brilliant study, the position 
of Prime Minister of the Secretariat – unlike other important central government positions - 
would be left vacant if the sovereign failed to find the personnel who suited his needs92. In 
contrast to the regulated and routinized processes of the bureaucracy, the relations of the 
Secretariat and its ministers with the emperor were personal, private and irregular. 
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Wen Yanbo had been appointed Vice Minister of the Secretariat by Li Yuan, and later 
promoted to Prime Minister by Li Shimin93.  Surprisingly, when Li Shimin promoted Wen 
Yanbo, he also ordered him to take charge, concurrently, of the responsibilities of the Vice 
Minister, which indicates that Wen would have dominated the department. Aside from Wen 
Yanbo himself, his two brothers, Wen Daya 溫大雅 and Wen Dayou 溫大有, were both 
confidants of the emperor and enjoy close personal relations with him94. Li Yuan and Wen 
Daya, in fact, were good friends before former’s uprising, and Daya also served as Li’s private 
secretary during the military campaign. Wen Daya was the author of Da Tang Chuang Ye Qi Ju 
Zhu 《大唐創業起居注》, a valuable record of the political history of the early Tang. As for 
Wen Dayou, he was assigned to assist Li Shimin during the campaign and later served along 
with his brother as private secretary of Li Yuan. In the first year of Wude (618 A.D.), he was 
appointed as the Vice Minister of the Department of Secretariat. 
 
If we now reconsider the scene in which Wen Yanbo is presenting his opinions and arguing 
fiercely with other officials, we should not be misled by what is described as his “loneliness.” 
At that particular moment, Wen Yanbo’s voice was in fact not his own. It was the emperor’s. 
The voice of the sovereign was always “alone”. Therefore, there were only two major plans 
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offered by the courtiers during the debate, not three. And these two positions recommended 
by Li Shimin’s court officials – either to force the Turkish defectors to become Han-Chinese 
farmers or simply to get rid of them – were perfectly reasonable solutions given the weakness 
of the early Tang regime.  
 
Although the disagreement between Wen Yanbo and other officials, especially Wei Zheng, 
was temporarily put aside once the emperor had made his choice, according to the sources 
the debate actually went on for years, agreement between the courtiers was never reached, 
and Wen had to defend the emperor’s decision constantly95, probably until Wen died in the 
eleventh year of Zhenguan (637 A.D.). Yet we can see that at least before the thirteenth year 
of Zhenguan (639 A.D.), the decision to settle the Turkish defectors in Ordos region was never 
seriously challenged. The emperor’s plan was evidently implemented and received no 
resistance from the Turks, whose interests it obviously satisfied. We know that after the exact 
locations of the settlements were determined, the original Turkish elites were appointed as 
the military governor (dudu 都督) of these settlements96.  
 
Ashina Simo 阿史那思摩, for example, was assigned to govern Xieli Khan’s followers, who had 
made up the core of the old confederacy. The Chinese sources suggest that while both Chuluo 
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Khan and Shibi Khan appreciate Simo’s personality and abilities, Xieli Khan had never trusted 
Simo with the authority of a large command because of his Iranian looks. Xieli doubted his 
Turkish (Ashina) pedigree97. Here, ethnic bias may have been introduced to explain what had 
been in fact a political decision, and there are no sources to suggest that such elites bias was 
prevalent among the rank and file. In fact, according to a recent study, Simo was not only a 
true descendant of the Turkish royal clan, his own lineage was also one of the noblest within 
the clan98. There therefore appears to have been no reason to question his authority to 
command troops or even to claim the title of great khan. In any case, it was clear from the 
perspective of the aristocratic values and political practices of the confederacy, Simo’s 
qualifications for leadership of the defectors were not in doubt. We do not know, however, 
whether his leadership was welcomed by Turkish commoners. The sources say that after Simo 
was appointed as great khan by Li Shimin in the thirteenth year of Zhenguan (639 A.D.), he 
was ordered to lead the defectors back to their original homeland. It is also said that many of 
the defectors returned to the Ordos Region a few years later because Simo was not and 
adequate ruler 99 . Yet these records should not be used to argue that Simo was an 
inappropriate or unwanted choice from a Turkish perspective because his rule was always 
threatened by Xue-Yantuo and the balance between the two was not in favor of the Turks.  
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If the case of Simo’s appointment is not decisive proof of Tang’s willingness to accommodate 
Turkish traditions of leadership, then the appointment of Ashina Sunishi 阿史那蘇尼失 can 
be regarded as another evidence. Unlike Simo, Sunishi was a member of the Turkish royal clan 
who had his own followers. It was said that he governed his people with generosity and 
kindness, such that they were willing to follow him to whatever end. When Xieli Khan was 
abandoned by his people because of his centralizing policies and the economic difficulties of 
the confederacy, Sunishi and his men were one of those chose to follow their great khan100.  
The account of Sunishi is as superficial and ambiguous as that of Simo, but at least we can 
conclude that in contrast to Xieli Khan, who was detested because of his autocratic rule that 
reflected his adaptation of Chinese and perhaps Iranian models, Sunishi was respected 
because of his generosity, and his appointment would have been welcomed by the 
commoners. We should not forget, too, that Sunishi was the younger brother of Qimin Khan, 
which means he would have qualified to be a new great khan. 
 
Simo and Sunishi of course were not the only two leaders which were appointed by Tang. As 
we have mentioned in the previous chapter, Tuli Khan defected to Tang with his subjects 
before the war against Xieli Khan had officially begun and was ordered by Li Shimin to continue 
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to govern his subjects after the war101. We know nothing about Tuli Khan’s popularity among 
the commoners, but apparently, there were no large-scale defections from him. Since Simo, 
Sunishi and Tuli Khan were given Chinese-style official titles, they fit nicely into the empire’s 
governmental system, but these three appointments also suggest that Turkish customs and 
traditions of leadership were preserved, and this was an aim of Chinese policy. The only 
change was the absence of a great khan from the Ashina clan. 
 
In the thirteenth year of Zhenguan, a coup was unleashed by Tuli Khan’s younger brother 
Ashina Jiesheslü 阿史那結社率 and his supporters while Li Shimin was traveling to Jiucheng 
Palace 九成宮102. Jiesheslü was among the Turkish elites traveling with the emperor, and it 
appears that he wanted to re-found the confederacy by assassinate Li Shimin and establishing 
Tuli’s son, Ashina Heluohu 阿史那賀邏鶻, who had joined the plot under duress, as a new 
great khan. The coup was a total failure, Jiesheslü and his men were killed when they tried to 
flee, and Heluohu was sent to an exile103. The attempted coup resulted in the loss of only a 
dozen imperial guards and some horses, but it was significant enough for the long opposition 
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to Li Shimin’s Turkish policies associated with the majority of the civil bureaucrats to force the 
emperor to send the Turks away104. This time, there was no one to speak for the emperor: 
Wen Yanbo had passed away two years earlier. 
 
From our modern perspective, the courtiers’ opinion may seem unreasonable. First of all, the 
coup involved only about forty men, they were certainly not the majority of the defectors. 
Second, because these forty men were traveling with the emperor along with Jiesheslü, we 
must assume that they were all elites, and there is no evidence to suggest that either these 
elites or their plan had any support among either commoners or other elites. In fact, Jieshelü 
is recorded as having been a scoundrel and thoroughly disliked by Tuli Khan, although this 
judgment may have been a later interpolation. Thirdly, these men didn’t receive any help 
during their escape, which means that the conspiracy had not been widely shared. Stealing 
horses from the imperial stable, moreover, makes the coup looked more like an 
improvisational act than a well-organized rebellion. In any case, once Li Shimin had been 
severely criticized by his officials, the emperor was compelled to admit that his life and the 
empire had been nearly ruined due to his earlier “disobedience” to Wei Zheng’s plan105. 
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At this point, we might think that the plan to nourish the Northern Turkish defectors and to 
incorporate them into the empire had been abandoned: Ashina Simo had been appointed as 
the new great khan and charged with the responsibility of leading the defectors back to their 
original settlements beyond the Yellow River, a region which now shadowed, and threatened, 
by Xue-Yantuo. The confrontation between the Turks and Xue-yantuo would be inevitable106. 
Yet we recall that when Wen Yanbo had suggested that Tang should demonstrate its 
benevolence by taking care of the Turks, this involved the practical consideration that the 
defectors would help to protect the borders by joining Tang military system. It is therefore 
difficult to believe that the policy of rebuilding a Tang-supported Turkish confederacy and the 
growth of Xue-Yantuo’s power were unrelated events107. In fact, the source suggests that after 
Xue-Yantuo learned about the reconstruction of the Turkish confederacy, their khan 
complained to Li Shimin about the decision and began to prepare his light cavalry to attack 
the Turks108. Zi Zhi Tong Jian indicates that Turkish forces played an important part in the 
military conflicts between the Tang and Xue-Yantuo109, so it’s clear that for the Turks, been 
nourished by Tang had its price. If we go further by examing how frequently did Turkish forces 
showed up in the military expansions during Li Shimin’s reign, it’s even clearer that the price 
was not small at all110. In fact, it’s not unreasonable for us to say Tang gained its ability to 
                                                     
106 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.195, p.213. 
107 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.195, p.208.195. 
108 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.194, p.5164. 
109 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.196, p.227. 
110 For example, the Turks paid their military services in battles against Tibetan, Tuyuhun, Xue-Yantuo and Qiuci. 
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expand only after it had absorbed the defectors of the confederacy. 
 
Having discussed the situation of Turkish commoners, we also need to have a look at how Li 
Shimin incorporated the Northern Turkish elites who defected to Tang. With the downfall of 
and the confederacy and Xieli Khan’s authority, thousands of Turkish elites moved to Chang’an. 
This must have been a stunning scene, and is described in Zi Zhi Tong Jian. The chiefs and 
leaders who came to the court were all given central military positions (e.g. Jiangjun 將軍 or 
Zhonglangjiang 中郎將). Over one hundred Turks received rank five or above, comparable to 
the number of civil officials with similar ranks at court. The Turkish elites who settled down in 
Chang’an numbered close to ten thousand households111. The figure, which is found in Zi Zhi 
Tong Jian is probably not inaccurate. The Xin Tang Shu gives the smaller number (only couple 
thousands)112, which may indicate that there was a dispute between the original sources used 
by the two. It is possible that both of the figures were exaggerated since the ratio of the elites 
who gained rank five or above to the total households doesn’t match, or that the total number 
of households included the households of the non-elites which, in fact, is suggested in Tang 
Hui Yao113. Or perhaps the figures also include those who were granted ranks lower than five. 
                                                     
Details can be seen in Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.194, p.188; vol.195, p.207; vol.196, p.227; vol.198, p.264 and p.275. 
Also, although there was no concrete evidence to prove that the Turks joined the Korean campaign in a grand 
scale, considering that many Turkish elites had paid their services in the campaign, it is very possible that these 
elites were actually leading Turkish forces. 
111 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.193, p.170. 
112 Xin Tang Shu, vol.215, p.6038. 
113 Tang Hui Yao, vol.73, p.1557. There is a difference in the narration between Zi Zhi Tong Jian and Tang Hui Yao: 
The former considers that “because of ” (yin’er 因而) the elites were given central military positions which were 
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In any case, the descriptions of the military positions granted to the elite Turks and the figure 
for the number of those gaining rank five or above are the same in these sources. While the 
numbers are in dispute, all the sources seem to acknowledge the fact that the Turkish elites 
were welcomed and generally well treated, making it easy for us to identify and discount the 
literati prejudice which pervades these official sources. 
 
Here it is appropriate to say something about the role of the literati in Tang government. Far 
too often historians assume that, and write as if, the majority of officials were civil officials, 
that these made up the largest and most important part of the central government, and that 
they uniformly detested the Turkish elites, who joined the court, as uncivilized and incorrigible 
foreigners. Indeed, as we saw in the discussion of what to do about the Turkish commoners, 
the conservative point of view was no doubt shared by a majority of civil officials. Lai Ruihe 
賴瑞和, one of our most brilliant scholars of Tang officialdom and its bureaucratic system, 
claims that one of the biggest mistakes made by Tang historians has been the assumption that 
only those who passed the imperial exams qualified as officials114, and that terms like “official” 
or “courtier” should always be qualified by the term “civil”. Literati writing certainly dominates 
                                                     
rank five and above, the households of the elites which moved into Changan were close to ten thousands, while 
the latter doesn’t emphasize this “cause and effect” relation. Instead, Tang Hui Yao only says that “the tribes are 
settled in Shuofang, the southern side of the Yellow River, and the households that move into Changan are about 
ten thousands.” [處其部落於河南朔方之地，入居長安者近萬家。]  
114 Lai Ruihe 賴瑞和, Tangdai Zhongceng Wenguan《唐代中層文官》 (Taipei: Linking Publishing Company, 
2008), p.523. 
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extant Tang sources: poetries, stories, private and official histories, and so forth. Most of the 
biographies of Jiu Tang Shu and Xin Tang Shu were devoted to civil officials, and according to 
Lai, most of the extant stone stelae are also attributed to civil officials115 . In short, the 
remaining sources are infused with and overwhelmed by the voice and perspective of the 
scholar-official. Lai’s study also shows, however, that there were over four hundred types of 
ranked position (also known as “within the stream”, or ruliu 入流) that made up the central 
government, including provincial offices, and there were only about one hundred of them 
which the literati were competent with or willing to serve. Most of the remaining positions 
required military or technical services, including such things as supervising horse breeding, 
wine brewing or public construction116, which the literati were incompetent with or unwilling 
to serve. This “silence majority” actually formed the core allowing the government and empire 
to function. 
 
Although the Tang government in general was largely formed by non-literati, it would be 
inappropriate to claim that a civilian-centered government in the Tang the product of literati’s 
imagination. As Lai suggests, literati occupied the central executive positions as well as other 
of the most respected posts117. And, as we can have seen, literati like Wei Zheng or Xiao Yu 
                                                     
115 Lai Ruihe, Tangdai Zhongceng Wenguan, p.526. 
116 Lai Ruihe, Tangdai Zhongceng Wenguan, pp.523-524, p.526. 
117 Lai Ruihe, Tangdai Zhongceng Wenguan, p.526. 
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were among those closest to the sovereign and let their voices be heard. Yet we shouldn’t 
overrate the influence of such civil officials on the emperor because, first, there were are 
fewer of them, and, second, literati generally lacked military skill, knowledge or experience, 
making it very difficult for them to affect the strategic decisions of the emperor. In some 
circumstances, literati might hold civil posts within a regiment or during a campaign, but they 
never actually command troops, drew up battle plans or killed enemies. There were literati 
who began their careers as civil officials and later became talented generals118, Yet such 
people were exceptional. As for the technical and supervisory services, Lai also suggests that 
the literati either lacked the required skills or simply looked down on such roles119. All these 
deficiencies of the civil officials granted the emperor a lot of room for maneuver, and it was 
easy enough for him to avoid or ignore their opinions (or, for example by staging a debate in 
which an official such as Wen Yanbo could represent the preferred imperial position). 
 
Li Shimin’s posthumous title was changed four times between 649 A.D. and 754 A.D. In 754 
A.D. (the thirteenth year of Tianbao during Li Longji’s 李隆基 reign), his posthumous title was 
finalized as Great Cultured and Martial Sage, Vast and Brilliant Emperor whose Filiality Extends 
Widely (Wenwu Dasheng Daguangxiao Huangdi 文武大聖大廣孝皇帝), a title considered by 
                                                     
118 For example, both Lou Shide 婁師德 and Tang Xiujing 唐休璟 began their careers as civil officials and 
shifted to military positions later. Details can be found in Jiu Tang Shu, vol.93, pp.2975-2976 and pp.2978-2980. 
119 Lai Ruihe, Tangdai Zhongceng Wenguan, p.524. 
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contemporaries to reflect the virtues and achievements of the second emperor. Yet when Li 
Shimin passed away in the twenty-third year of Zhenguan (649 A.D.), his posthumous title was 
simply Wen Huangdi 文皇帝, The Cultured Emperor. Li Shimin, I believe, would have found 
this title hilarious, because despite his facility for calligraphy and poetic composition, despite 
the attempts by his son and courtiers to whitewash his past (still there in the titular phrase 
Daguangxiao 大廣孝), his achievements were all measured on the battlefield.  
 
Li Shimin began his military career by leading troops in the rescue of Yang Guang, emperor of 
Sui, who had been surrounded by Turkish forces at Yanmen 雁門. After that, from the siege 
of Luoyang through the attack on Dou Jiande, the attack on Liu Heita 劉黑闥, the Coup of 
Xuanwu Gate and the Korean campaign, it is not an exaggeration to say that the lives he took 
and the lives he ordered to be taken far exceeded the number of poetic couplets he would 
ever compose. Li Shimin was good at war and seldom lost on the battlefield, and the simple 
moniker “The Martial Emperor” more accurately described his achievements, as it had his 
father’s120, if the repeating of the posthumous titles of the two emperors and the need to 
cover the brutal side of the founding of a dynasty and the building of an empire was not an 
issue to consider. In any case, after reviewing all his military success, it will be awkward for us 
                                                     
120 Li Yuan was dedicated Taiwu Huangdi 太武皇帝, which means The Grand Martial Emperor in 635 A.D. as his 
posthumous title. His title was also changed several times in the following years and, in 754 A.D., his title was 
changed into The Devine Augustus Supreme Emperor with Enlightened Filial Piety (Shenyao Dasheng 
Daguangxiao Huangdi 神堯大聖大光孝皇帝). We can see that the “Martial” part was gone. 
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to consider that a general-emperor wouldn’t praise martial sprite, or simply think that “Wen” 
was the only sprite that worth to be praised. 
 
According to Gu Jiguang’s 谷霽光 study, Li Yuan honored military personnel, the generals and 
rebel leaders alike whose services and loyalty he needed to consolidate his new dynasty121. 
And when we come to Li Shimin’s reign, we can not see critical sign of the reduce of such 
needs since many major expansions happened during that era, not to mention that the 
emperor himself was an achieved general who understand the value of military officials. 
Although Li Shimin’s considerable military achievements and praise for the martial spirit were 
significantly toned down if not ignored by official historians, we still can find some, 
interestingly, some of the traces in the extant sources of conflict between civil officials and 
this “martial emperor”.  
 
The first trace of conflict I will examine is between Liu Rengui 劉仁軌 and Li Shimin122. As the 
source suggests, during a year of Zhenguan, Liu Rengui was serving as the security officer 
(xianwei 縣尉) of Chencang prefecture 陳倉縣. A commander of the regional garrison system 
(zhechongduwei 折衝都尉), Lu Ning 魯寧, was under Liu’ supervision, but because his rank 
was much higher than either the security officer or the magistrate, he was routinely rude and 
                                                     
121 Gu Jiguang 谷霽光, Fubing Zhidu Kaoshi《府兵制度考釋》(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2011), p.123. 
122 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.84, p.2789. 
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violent. Liu warned him for several times, hoping that he might correct his behavior, without 
success. In the end, Liu ordered Lu to be beaten to death. Because Lu’s position was the 
linchpin of the entire garrison system, his death was reported to the emperor. Infuriated by 
the report, Li Shimin said: “Who is this security officer who has my commander at will?” [是
何縣尉，輒殺吾折衝!] He ordered Liu to come to the court immediately and explain. While 
the civil official123 was simply fulfilling his duties, the emperor was infuriated because the 
offender was a military official, who was the emperor’s personal and loyal servant. Although 
Li Shimin found the young man to be brilliant and honest, and was forgiven for his “crime” and 
later promoted to a higher civil post in the central government, the whole story reminds us of 
the punishment that would have awaited Liu if he had not been such a talented person who 
fascinated the emperor.  
 
The second trace may be found in what transpired between Li Jing 李靖, a famous general of 
early Tang, and Li Shimin 124 . According to the sources, Xiao Yu, the Chief of Censorate 
                                                     
123 Some may criticize our argument by saying that the security officers of prefectures were in charge of local 
security, therefore they were not exactly civil officials. Indeed, according to Tang Liu Dian 《唐六典》{Li Linfu 
李林甫, Tang Liu Dian 《唐六典》 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2014), vol.30, pp.752-753.}, maintaining local 
security (a semi-military duty) was one of the major duties of the security officers, but Tang Liu Dian claims that 
as the assistant of the magistrate, the security officer also in charge of civil affairs like collecting taxes, pursuing 
owing taxes, and supervise the subordinates who worked for the magistrate. All these works were filled with 
paperwork and were knowledge-required. In fact, Liu Rengui was said to be a very knowledgeable person who 
used to help a courtier to polish his proposal (perhaps serving as his private assistant). Therefore, we should 
regard the security officer as the very foundation (auxiliary rank 9b to 9a, depend on the size, the population, 
and the prosperity of the prefecture, which was the lowest rank within the whole system) of the imperial civil 
bureaucracy. 
124 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.193, pp.170-171; Xin Tang Shu, vol.93, p.3814. According to the remaining sources, the 
story has two versions: Both ZZTJ and XTS suggest that it was Xiao Yu who reported to Li Shimin that Li Jing 
allowed his soldiers to sack Xieli Khan’s treasure. But according to Jiu Tang Shu (vol.67, p.2480), Da Tang Xin Yu
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(yushidafu 御史大夫), impeached Li Jing because, after defeating Xieli Khan, he had allowed 
his troops to run wild and sack the great khan’s treasure-house. Resulting in the disappearance 
of the entirety of valuable goods of the Northern Turks. Xiao Yu, as the one who was 
responsible for impeaching officials who violated the law, wanted Li Shimin to send Li Jing to 
the courts for investigation and punishment. The emperor pardoned Li Jing, and while 
reprimanding him for his mistake, he also promoted him, granting him a thousand bolts of silk 
and five hundred households as rewards. The emperor, in fact, contrasted his forgiving nature 
to the mean emperor Yang Jian, who didn’t reward a general for his achievements but 
executed him for his mistake. Some later, Li Shimin said something even more astonishing to 
Li Jing: “ Now I realize that someone tried to slander you beforehand, hope you wouldn’t mind 
the reproach (that I had to give you).” [前有人讒公，今朕意已寤，公勿以為懷。] After which 
the emperor gave Li two thousand bolts of silk. Compare with the first story that we examine, 
Xiao Yu and Li Jing’s position was certainly much higher than that of Liu Rengui and Lu Ning’s, 
but in both cases the emperor violated the routine and lawful civil process to protect his men, 
and even the highest officials in the central government could not object.  
                                                     
《大唐新語》[Composed by Liu Su 劉肅 and revised by Xu Denan 許德楠, Da Tang Xin Yu (Beijing Zhonghua 
Shuju, 1984), vol.7, pp.105-106], and Ce Fu Yuan Gui (vol.134, p.1618), it was Wen Yanbo who reported to the 
emperor. In his Zi Zhi Tong Jian Kao Yi《資治通鑑考異》, Sima Guang suggest that Jiu Tang Shu has made a 
mistake because according to the sources he had, it was the one who served as the Chief of Censorate who made 
the report. Wen Yanbo was promoted to the Prime Minster of the Department of Secretary in Feb, and the 
capture of Xieli Khan was in Mar. At that time, Xiao Yu was the one who served as the Chief of Censorate, not 
Wen Yanbo, therefore Xiao Yu should be the one who made the report. We decide to follow Sima Guang’s 
judgement because as we’ve discussed previously, Wen Yanbo was privately close to Li Shimin and served as the 
voice of the sovereign in court, therefore he should has less intention to speak for the civil bureaucrat (although 
he himself was a civil official) instead of speaking for the emperor. 
63 
 
 
The third example, similar to the second, occurred between another high-level military official, 
Hou Junji 侯君集, and Li Shimin125. After Hou Junji had captured the city of Gaochang 高昌, 
he personally sacked the city and forced its inhabitants into slavery. Following his example, his 
soldiers and officers followed suit. The legal departments in Chang’an somehow got hold of 
this information and insisted Hou be put in jail. Interestingly, this time Li Shimin followed the 
advice of the civil officials and put Hou in prison, but Hou was soon released after the Vice 
Minister of Secretariat, Cen Wenben 岑文本, memorialized the emperor. Here is another case 
in which a minister of the Secretariat served as the voice of the emperor126. In his memorial, 
Cen claimed that a military official’s duty was to defeat enemies, and that victory on the 
battlefield should be rewarded whether or not they were wild, greedy and ruthless, and that 
those who lost a war should be punished whether or not they were hard-working and 
incorruptible. Here, we can see that Cen’s voice echoed that of Li Shimin’s voice in our second 
example: in the case of his military officer, the ruler need to be generous and forgiving, putting 
aside the rules and laws which manipulated (partly at least) by the civil bureaucrats. 
 
Aside from looting the city, we can find the fourth example from Hou Junji’s career. Hou has 
                                                     
125 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.69, pp.2511-2514. 
126 Jiu Tang Shu, Vol.70, pp.2536-2538. Like Wen Yanbo, Cen Wenben also had close relations with Li Shimin. He 
was promoted to the Prime minister of Secretariat at around the seventeenth year of Zhenguan (643 A.D.). He 
was the one who help Li Shimin to arrange all the affairs of Korean campaign and died because of overfatigue. 
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later put in prison again, this time because he had tried to assist the crown prince Li Chengqian
李承乾 in staging a coup that was meant to preempt the ambition of his younger brother Li 
Tai 李泰. In prison, Hou was personally investigated by Li Shimin, not by the civil officials as 
required. The emperor said to the general: “I don’t want you to be insulted by ‘clerks with 
pens and knives’ (daobili 刀筆吏); I have therefore come to question you personally.” [我不
欲令刀筆吏辱公，故自鞫驗耳。] “Clerks with pens and knives” points to the civil officials in 
the courts and it strangely echoes with the Western Han general Li Ling’s 李陵 perspective: 
in a letter to Su Wu 蘇武127, Li Ling said that, after his surrender to the Xiongnu, a surrender 
over which he had had no control, he would not return to Chang’an with Su because, as a 
general who devoted his very life to the glory of the empire, he would not endure the 
inevitable insults of the “clerks with pens and knives”. The disturbing part of the emperor’s 
allusion is that while Li Ling might say whatever he wanted to about the civil bureaucrats, an 
emperor was supposed to honor his civil officials. Although the emperor clearly valued Hou 
Junji’s devotion over the bureaucratic or legal niceties of his civil officials, as he had with Li 
Jing, Hou Junji’s crime was unforgivable that even Li Shimin indicated to Hou that he intended 
to give him up by letting him know that every courtier was eager to see him die. 
 
                                                     
127 Edited by Zhang Wenzhi 張文治, Guoxue Zhiyao 《國學治要》(Taipei: Shijie Shuju, 2011), vol.2 of the 
fifth edition, pp.372-374. 
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The last example involves Qiu Xinggong 丘行恭 and Li Shimin128. In the seventeenth year of 
Zhenguan (643 A.D.), general Liu Lancheng 劉蘭成 was reported to have rebelled. After Liu’s 
execution, Qiu Xinggong retrieved and consumed his heart and liver. Hearing about this 
cannibalism, the emperor reproached his general: “Lancheng tried to rebel and the empire 
has regular punishments to punish him. You don’t need to go this far! If [you think that eating 
the traitor's heart and liver] demonstrates loyalty and filial piety, then the crown prince and 
kings should be the first to eat, not you!” [蘭成謀反，國有常刑，何至如此！若以為忠孝，
則太子諸王先食之矣，豈至卿邪！] Here, Li Shiming’s voice is rather interesting since it 
seems that the emperor was trying to tell his general that the laws and punishments are 
sufficient, adopting the perspective of the emperor’s civil officials. In this case, it appears that 
Li Shimin was finally acting as an ideal Confucian emperor, who himself submits to laws and 
regulations, but the emperor does in fact acknowledged Qiu Xinggong’s behavior as a way of 
showing loyalty. The only thing that the emperor seemed unhappy about was that the general 
had forgotten his position: He should let the crown prince and kings, the emperor’s male 
relatives, enjoy the bounty first. What the emperor was saying was that Qiu Xinggong’s 
behavior existed within the private or personal realm of relations between the ruling house 
and its trusted generals that were outside the public realm of civil norms, but that in such 
cases it was up to the emperor to decide whether such actions were appropriate. In this 
                                                     
128 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.196, p.234. 
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particular case, Li Shimin decided that they were not, but all four of the examples discussed 
above confirm that the relation between the emperor and the military officials who risked 
their lives for him played out in a realm not subject to the “pens and knives” of civil 
bureaucrats. 
  
So, what did these complex interactions between Li Shimin, his military officials and civil 
bureaucrats have to do with the Turkish elites who had shown up on Chang’an’s doorstep?  
 
According to Tang Liu Dian, both “The Sixteen Garrisons of the Southern Army” (nanya 
Shiliuwei 南衙十六衛) and “The Left and Right Garrisons of the Northern Army” (zuoyou 
Yulinwei 左右羽林軍衛 ) were led by jiangjun and zhonglangjiang 129 . In principle, the 
Southern Army was controlled by civil bureaucrats and the Northern Army directly and solely 
by the emperor or crown prince (or later, eunuch). But in reality, the officers, the soldiers, and 
even the generals of both armies were highly interchangeable130, since both armies were 
tasked with protecting the emperor and his court. Bureaucratic oversight should not be 
overestimated. The only different between them, as far as we know, is that the Northern Army 
guarded the Xuanwu Gate, the most strategic position of the palace which geographically 
close to the emperor’s residence. There would be many attempted coups in the history of 
                                                     
129 Tang Liu Dian, vol.24 and vol.25, pp.610-653. 
130 Gu Jiguang, Fubing Zhidu Kaoshi, pp.159-160. 
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Tang in which the one who had gained the support of the Northern Army often succeeded131. 
It was therefore necessary that its commanders should be among the emperor’s most trusted 
generals. Now, many Turkish elites, as we have seen, were granted central military positions 
of jiangjun or zhonglangjiang, and many of these now resided in Chang’an. We do not know 
to which of the two armies they were assigned, but they too owed their loyalty, like their 
Chinese counterparts in these armies, directly to Li Shimin, and Li Shimin, in turn, expressed 
his gratitude and generosity to them personally and in private. 
 
We have evidence of his concern for his Turkish officers: Ashina Simo was injured during 
Korean campaign, Li Shimin personly helped him to clean his wound132. Qibi Heli 契苾何力, 
another leader of a part-Turkish tribe, was also injured during Korean campaign, and Li Shimin 
provided him with medicine133. Ashina She’er asked for permission of commit suicide after Li 
Shimin’s death so he could serve the emperor in another world134. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Li Shimin treated these Turkish military officers exceptionally well because they 
were Turkish. Rather we see an emperor who valued military achievements and valor and the 
personal loyalty of his generals, whether Chinese or Turkish. 
 
                                                     
131 Chen Yinke, Tangdai Zhengzhishi Luegao, pp.91-104. 
132 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.66, p.2465, vol.194, p.5165; Tong Dian, vol.197, p.5416; Xin Tang Shu, vol.215, p.6040. 
133 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.198, p.258; Ce Fu Yuan Gui, vol.417, p.4971 
134 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.109, p.3290. Xin Tang Shu, vol.110, p.4116. 
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There is evidence also shows of relations between the Turkish elites in Chang’an and the 
crown prince, Li Chengqian 李承乾. Once he privately called on some Turks to join him in his 
palace. A civil official (one of the crown prince’s instructors) discovered the secret meeting 
and sent Chengqian a written remonstrance, describing the Turks he met in his palace as 
heartless beasts disguised as humans. The crown prince was so angry that he sent out 
assassins to kill that official135. We do not know the identities of this group of Turks, but we 
do know that one of them was called “Da Ge Zhi”達哥支. Cen Zhongmian 岑仲勉 suggests 
that because Li Shimin’s elder brother Li Jiancheng 李建成 had a subordinate called “Ke Da 
Zhi”可達志, which means “partner” in Turkish, and since “Ke Da” and “Ge Da” was very close 
in Chinese pronunciation and can be interchangeable when imitating the pronunciations of 
foreign languages, the recorder or the copiest might mistakenly have written “Ge Da” as “Da 
Ge”, which was a fairly common error in Chinese sources when copying the Chinese imitation 
of foreign pronunciations136. The sources confirm that “Ke Da Zhi” was actually one of the 
military officers in Li Jiancheng’s guard troops - perhaps that was why he was called “partner”-  
and helped Jiancheng recruit other Turks as his palace-guards137. Of course, we cannot be sure 
that this “Da Ge Zhi ” was one of Chengqian’s military officers. But we do know that the crown 
prince obviously valued martial power and military personnel. One of the assassins he had 
                                                     
135 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.78, pp.2696-2697; Ce Fu Yuan Gui, vol.714, p.8488; Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.196, p.225. 
136 Cen Zhongmian 岑仲勉, Tujue Jishi《突厥集史》(Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1958), pp.223-224. 
137 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.191, p.115; Xin Tang Shu, vol.79, p.3542. 
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sent out, for example, was one of his guards, Hegan Chengji 紇干承基138. This man had been 
appointed by Li Shimin as a commander of the regional garrison system in Youchuan 祐川 
after Chengqian lost his position and prestige139, which shows that he possessed military 
talent. Apparently, Chengji was not the only guard that served the crown prince by doing his 
“dirty work”. Feng Shijin 封師進, another mid-ranking officer in Chengqian’s palace guard, also 
served as another of the crown prince’s assassins140. Sadly, we have no more information 
about Feng Shijin, Hegan Chengji, Lu Ning, and the many other middle-ranking military officers 
who probably had close ties to the imperial family. There was also Hou Junji, of course, who 
assisted the crown prince in his coup attempt and was ultimately executed for rebellion along 
with Li Anyan 李安儼, a zhonglangjiang of the Southern Army141. Li Chengqian also aspired to 
be himself a “She” under Ashina Simo’s command142, an aspiration which was completely 
unacceptable and which deeply offended the civil officials not only because “She” was in 
charge of leading large-scale troops, but also because it was a Turkish position. More 
importantly, the speaker was the crown prince, the will-be-emperor. Li Shimin’s another son 
Li Tai 李泰 had much better relations with the civil officials, many of whom were willing to 
serve as scholars in his palace143. Li Tai never hid his ambition to replace his brother and he 
                                                     
138 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.196, p.225. 
139 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.197, p.240. 
140 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.76, p.2649. 
141 Jiu Tang Shu, vol.76, p.2649. 
142 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.196, p.238. 
143 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.196, p.228. 
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had the support of the civil bureaucrats because unlike the crown prince, he was obviously 
less martial and more compliant than his brother or father. The sources therefore suggest that 
Chengqian loved to mingle with the “wretched”, and that he hate to be instructed by courtiers, 
yet we know that many of those whom the historians call wretched were in fact military 
officers, whether Turkish or Chinese. The civil official who had remonstrated against 
Chengqian for cavorting with Turks was actually criticizing Chengqian’s ideal of a general-
emperor which he had inherited from his father, and it was this that probably so offended him 
and prompted him to have the official killed.   
 
We have seen that military values were definitely praised by Li Shimin in the early Tang, and 
that the military officials enjoyed special relation with the emperor. This relation was not 
regulated by the civil officials and the law, and constituted what we will call the inner court 
based on personal relations with the emperor. In other words, Li Shimin’s court was highly 
militant, although he was still made a show of his willingness to work with the literati, even 
producing literati works himself, or at least not to overly drift away from them in public, unlike 
his first-born. The elites of the Turkish defectors were recruited into the military system and 
served as the emperor’s generals, therefore we can observe them in an “emperor-military 
officials” context. In this context, the relations between the Turkish elites and the emperor 
were personal and such relations are confirmed even in the breach: Ashina Jiesheslü’s betrayal 
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was a consequence of his personal dissatisfaction with Li Shimin and the emperor’s failure to 
grant him additional favors144. And Li Shimin acknowledged that Jiesheslü’s rebellion was a 
personal betrayal of the emperor and had nothing to do with his ethnic identity. After the 
rebel, Turkish elites of the defectors were still trusted by the emperor145. 
 
Finally, we might consider whether the means used by Li Shimin to incorporate the Turkish 
elites was compatible with the Turkish political cultural. Some scholars consider that Li Shimin 
was trying to keep the Turkish elites under his control, and that he appointed Turkish elites as 
his central military officers settled them in Chang’an in order to keep them away from Turkish 
commoners, the foundation of their original power146. There is no evidence to decide this 
question one way or another, but studies have shown that the rulers of the Inner Asian 
regimes constructed their power around the personal loyalty of their royal guards147. There 
seems to be little difference between this and Li Shimin’s relation with his military officers, 
whether Turkish or not. In the person of Li Shimin, Chinese and Turkish political culture seems 
to have overlapped, and the rebellion of a Turkish officer such as Jiesheslü was little different 
from the rebellion of a Chinese officer like Liu Lancheng, although we have little information 
                                                     
144 Zi Zhi Tong Jian, vol.195, p.212; Tang Hui Yao, vol.94, p.2002. 
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about the latter. The behavior of the crown prince, moreover, was quite similar to the behavior 
of the sons of Turkish khans, although he probably thought that he was only imitating his 
father.  
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Conclusion: 
 
After the collapse of Sui dynasty, the Northern Turkish confederacy became the dominant 
power in the Northeast Asian hinterland. Through their support of different political powers 
in north China, the confederacy was able to directly influence the political evolution of the 
region and the new Chinese order which would emerge there in the late-sixth and early-
seventh centuries. The confederacy, however, had little interest in allying with, or taking over, 
other regions of China, and this self-limitation placed the incipient Tang regime between the 
confederacy and the other north Chinese political powers and required the Tang founder to 
be both practical and flexible politically but also culturally.  
 
After Tang gradually defeated these competitors and reclaimed the former territories of Sui, 
the confederacy in fact strengthened its power by launching frequent attacks. These attacks 
were so deadly that Li Yuan considered moving the capital away from Chang’an. The 
confederacy also threatened the Tang by holding on to its Han-Chinese refugees. Repatriating 
them became a necessity for rebuilding the empire and the economy. Unfortunately, their 
return only occurred after the fall of the confederacy. At the start of the Tang, the regime was 
weak both within and without, and a full-scale attack on the confederacy was impossible. 
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Although the confederacy had military superiority, its inner instabilities should lead itself to 
its doom. After Xieli Khan became the great khan, he violated the original political practice of 
the confederacy by trusting and relying on Han-Chinese and Sogdian-Irian advisors, provoking 
dissatisfaction among both his elite and non-elite subordinates. The economic difficulties, 
caused by heavy snow and cold winters, undermined the livelihood of commoners on the 
steppe. The effect of elite dissatisfaction and commoner immiseration undermined Xieli 
Khan’s authority in general and provoked rebellion among the other steppe powers that were 
subordinate to the confederacy, and also contributed to a succession crisis in which Xieli Khan 
could no longer trust his closest kin. The centrifugal forces within the Ashina clan itself could 
not be contained. Tang did not play a significant role in abetting or encouraging these forces, 
but it did take advantage of the irreparable internal conflicts which doomed the confederacy. 
But Li Shimin would not have gained such glory if the power of the confederacy were not 
shrinking. 
 
After the collapse of the confederacy, about ten thousand Turks defected to the Tang, Tang 
had to come up with a solution that would both benefit the empire and please the defectors. 
There were always other powers in the East Asian hinterland to which the Turkish defectors 
could turn – to the ultimate detriment of the empire. As an experienced general, Li Shimin 
surely knew the military potential of Turkish light cavalry. Therefore he settled the majority of 
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Turkish commoners in the Ordos region and the northern edge of Loess Plateau, a vast 
borderland where the Turks could pursue their original livelihood and paid their military 
services when needed. Qualified Turkish elites were also appointed to be the leaders of these 
defectors, so that Turkish political practices would continue. If Li Shimin had followed the 
advice of the majority of his civil bureaucrats, transferring the Turks to the heartland of China 
and forcing them to practice farming, they and their descendants would have lost their 
military traditions and effectiveness. Or, if Wei Zheng’s advice was the plan to be followed, 
Tang would also lose the chance to gain the Turkish military power. Meanwhile, to incorporate 
the Turkish elites, Li Shimin granted them military official positions and honored them with 
the same personal attention he gave to his loyal Chinese generals, immunizing them from both 
civil bureaucratic oversight and the political tensions and conflict between military and civil 
officials at court. From the perspective of the Turkish elites, the personal relation between 
themselves and Li Shimin shared the same character of the relation between a Turkish khan 
and his subordinate: the former needed to be generous, caring and brave, while the latter 
would for pay this charisma with loyalty. With the loyalty of and service of the defectors, Tang 
had gained a critical victory within the grand process of incorporating the Turkish power. 
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